

The Ideology of “Strategic Conservatism” from Russia’s Imperial Perspective

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“Unfortunate is the country in which any conservatism has become cruel and abusive ... If so, there is a *revolution* being prepared in that country.” (Philosopher N. Berdyaev)

“Conservatism without an aggressive imperial idea turns into a preaching of petty-bourgeois conformism based on the logic ‘*if only it doesn’t get worse.*’” (Historian A. Minakov)

“Dmitry Medvedev is no less—in a good sense of the word—a Russian nationalist than I am.” (V. Putin)

Russian Religious Foundations of the Current Conservative-Liberal Clash

1) Christian religious denominations—Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism—originated from a single spiritual basis, a proto-Christianity, if you will. In 1054, the final split of the Eastern and Western churches took place, with Orthodoxy as the Eastern, and Catholic as the Western church. This great schism was the main cause of many inter-civilizational wars.

2) In 1653, Russia annexed Left-Bank Ukraine,¹ on whose territory the Greek rite was practiced. The Greek rite was also widespread in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Russian rite differed from the Greek one. For example, the name of Christ was rendered differently—Jesus being spelled “Isus” as opposed to Jesus spelled “Iisus,” and baptismal rites that were carried out using two fingers rather than three.² The unification of the Russian and Greek rites would unite all the Slavs—Eastern and Balkan—and

1 Left-bank Ukraine is a historic name of the part of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper River comprising the modern-day oblasts of Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy, as well as the eastern parts of Kyiv and Cherkasy.

2 Patriarch Nikon (1605-1681) launched widespread reforms within the Orthodox church, revising church ceremonies, literature, and even such changes as the rendering of the name “Jesus” to correspond to the Greek spelling, written in ancient Greek as ὁ Ἰησοῦς—in Cyrillic letters, “Иисус”—rather than the usual Russian spelling “Исус.” Another change made was in making the Sign of the Cross: Nikon’s change called for the use of three vice two fingers so that

would lay the foundation for the Great Greco-Russian Empire. Consequently, Patriarch Nikon carried out church reform on behalf of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.³ However, the introduction of changes in the liturgical books and in some rites aimed at unifying them with the modern Greek ones themselves caused a schism in the church, with Avvakum and the Old Believers pulling away from the Nikonians—followers of Nikon and the official Russian Orthodox church.⁴ Echoes of that spiritual-based feud can be seen, in part, in the clash of the current Russian conservative and liberal ideologies, that is, modern-day Old Believers—the carriers of traditional Russian folk religiosity— vs. Western liberals.

- 3) Russian culture is one of spiritual integrity and one which views truth as a living ontological essence in the world. The followers of Nikon upset the fundamental foundations of the

Russian worldview and mindset. The change in the rites of worship and the structural alterations in the hierarchy of the church administration disrupted, for worshippers, the organic connection between God and the Church. Before those “innovations,” it was considered an undeniable truth that only the “two-fingered” (Old Believer) sign of the cross reflected the true dogmatics of the Christian Creed—the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ—as well as the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine. In the three-fingered (New Ritual or Nikonian) sign of the cross, from the standpoint of dogma, there was a distortion in the true meaning of the sign of the cross: it was as if making the sign with three fingers signified that the Trinity was crucified on the Cross! The church oath and the decrees of the Stoglav Council of 1551⁵ secured the inviolability of the two-fingered practice:

the Russian Orthodox sign was in line with the Greek practice. The effect on Russian society was profound: The Old Believers were anathematized for almost two and a half centuries, and the consequences of the schism in the Russian Orthodox Church have not completely been overcome to this day. <https://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/religion/patriarch-nikon/index.html>

- 3 Nikon attracted the attention of Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich in 1646 and soon became his confidant and spiritual advisor. He also became an important figure in the reformers, the Zealots of Piety. By 1652, Nikon was consecrated patriarch of Moscow and all Russia and was directed to institute reforms advocated by the Zealots and supported by the Tsar. See <https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/nikon-patriarch>
- 4 Patriarch Nikon brutally persecuted Avvakum’s “Old Believer” followers who refused to accept liturgical reforms. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Avvakum-Petrovich> and URL <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raskol>
- 5 The Stoglav Synod or Hundred Chapter Council [in Russian, Стоглавый собор] was a church council held in Moscow in 1551 with the participation of Tsar Ivan IV, Metropolitan Macarius, and representatives of the Boyar Duma. The Council produced a church code formatted as a record of questions by the Tsar to the clergy. It consisted of 100 chapters and recorded

“If anyone does not bless with two fingers like Christ or does not imagine the sign of the cross, let him be damned.”⁶

- 4) This “innovative postmodern act” of spiritual transformation changed the very concept of sin. The disoriented flock, uprooted from its religious norms, lost confidence in its ability to discern the “righteous” from the “sinner.” At the Last Judgment, “the Lord will place the righteous at His right hand (on the right hand), and sinners on the left (on the left hand).”⁷ A latent fear arose among the parishioners going to the temple of the Lord that they would not please the “heretics with no grace”⁸ because of the confusion that had arisen. They called Patriarch Nikon, who declared about

himself “I am Russian in body, but Greek in soul,” the Antichrist.

- 5) It took a long time for the split Orthodoxy to return to a state of unity. According to folklore- and ethnic-based beliefs and traditions, the broken parts were first spliced together, then spiritualized with living water, and only then was its soul returned. At the local councils of 1918 and 1971, the Russian Church recognized the equal salvation power of the old rites. The Edinoverie Church⁹ returned the Old Believers to the Ecumenical Church, with “Edinoverie” referring to “one faith”—the Ecumenical Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) restored the truth about Patriarch Nikon.¹⁰ With the advocacy of the thesis

decisions by the Council governing church ceremonies, duties, and other matters. https://orthodoxwiki.org/Stoglavny_Sobor

- 6 In the original Russian text, the author, Dr. Vertlieb, provides the reader with this quote not in Russian, but in Church Slavonic, the liturgical language still in use today in the Russian Orthodox Church.
- 7 Here the author is using archaic Russian adverbs (Church Slavonic) followed by their contemporary Russian counterparts in parentheses though they are translated the same. Also, the author notes that the standing of sinners on the left hand also refers to the position of the hand on the left shoulder when making the sign of the cross.
- 8 Here the “heretics without grace” refer to the Nikonist reformers who were instituting changes that were unsettling to the traditional worshipers. Discord continues today among various manifestations of the Orthodox church with the same label being used to condemn the alternative churches.
- 9 Edinoverie [in Russian, Единоверие] is an arrangement between certain communities of Russian Old Believers and the Russian Orthodox Church, whereby the communities are treated as a part of the mainstream church, while maintaining their own traditional rites. Thus, they are often described as Old Ritualists rather than Old Believers [in Russian, староритуалисты and старообрядцы, respectively.] <https://orthodoxwiki.org/Edinoverie>
- 10 On May 3, 1910, Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky) delivered a lecture entitled “Restored Truth about Patriarch Nikon” [in Russian, “Возстановленная истина о Никоне”] which offered new, ground-breaking interpretations of Nikon’s life—his words and actions. See (1910) *Mirnyj Trud* [in Russian, Мирный труд] 9, 140-171. Note: On the 75th anniversary of An-

“Byzantium is the foremother of Russia” (which was helped by the convincing film of Metropolitan Tikhon *The Death of the Empire: A Byzantine Lesson*),¹¹ Nikon’s Christian cosmopolitanism was rehabilitated as “apostolic neo-Byzantism.” Patriarch Nikon, it turns out, then also defended the idea of a “symphony of authorities” (one which was “two-headed”—spiritual and secular), now in demand in Russia, headed by an Orthodox tsar-autocrat, the one anointed by God.

- 6) The opposition of both confessions to Catholicism furthered the unification of the Orthodox branches of the clergy. The opposition of these antipodes is ontological. According to the philosopher-theologian V. V. Zenkovsky,¹² Catholicism, being content with only the external trappings of piety, did not accept the teachings of Christ concerning the inner conversion of a person to truth and love. Thus, it rejected the gospel of Christ about freedom whereas Orthodoxy “is truly free in Christ” and consequently, in the

eyes of Orthodox authenticity, Catholicism “lost the truly Christian principle.”

- 7) On the other hand, the idea of theocracy (God+control) appeared, which, when applied to society, gave rise to the temptation to subordinate humanity to a single authority (globalism of a “world government”). All other troubles grew out of this. According to Zenkovsky, Christianity, reformed by Catholicism, is “socialist” in spirit in the sense of forcibly leading people to a social “paradise” of material well-being. And from the unintentional consequences of the Catholic reformation of Christianity—“Catholic socialism”—it was only a stone’s throw away from revolutionary socialism with a human face: “that chaos of freedom, that chaos of immorality in which modern humanity lives, was caused by the fact that Catholicism rejected Christ’s teaching about freedom.” Modernization within the Catholic church life—the involvement of the faithful in church-based social and religious

thony’s death, the original text was reprinted: (9 August 2011) *Russkaya Narodnaya Liniya*. https://ruskline.ru/analitika/2011/08/10/vozstanovlennaya_istina

- 11 The documentary film “The Death of the Empire. A Byzantine Lesson” was written and narrated by Russian-Greek Archimandrite Tikhon. According to one review, the film deals with the Byzantine Empire’s “degradation and how it lost its ‘ability to respond to the calls of history’.... Due to a reference to the Emperor Constantine as The Drunkard, not a few critics saw in the film a portrayal of the late President’s Yeltsin’s crumbling Russia and considered the documentary an attempt to help President Putin’s hand-picked successor and [then] current President Dmitri Medvedev win the election.” https://neomagazine.com/2008_06_june/2008_06_10.html
- 12 V. V. Zenkovsky is a noted historian of Russian philosophy and author of several works on the subject, including his two-volume *History of Russian Philosophy*, first published in English by Columbia University Press in 1953.

activities—was a catalyst for revolutionary positivist social upheavals. In the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor” from F. M. Dostoevsky’s novel *The Brothers Karamazov*,¹³ the Catholic assertion that humanity is incapable of Christian freedom is brought to the fore and explored. Having lost faith in Christ, the Inquisitor wants to solve social problems without Christ, but with the help of a “sick” Catholic church that has departed from his precepts. The meaning of this allusion is to prove the primacy of the need to “instill the ideal of beauty into souls” over the calls of socialists to “Feed, then ask for virtue!”¹⁴

- 8) Catholicism, as the Slavophile¹⁵ A. Khomyakov¹⁶ asserted, betrays the

principle of freedom in the name of unity, while Protestantism is the opposite. In terms of this concept, only Orthodoxy remained true to the spirit of early Christianity, being a harmonious combination of unity and freedom in the principle of Christian love. Having rejected the principle of “sobornost,” Catholicism was pervaded by rationalism; Protestantism did nothing more than further develop Catholic rationalism, leading the way from unity to freedom. “The West,” culturologist N. A. Narochitskaya maintains, “is freedom ‘from what’ (i.e., the absence of restrictions), while Russia is freedom ‘for what’ (i.e., why freedom is needed).”¹⁷ Orthodoxy is the freedom to serve

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- 13 *The Brothers Karamazov* was first published in serial form by The Russian Messenger Literary-Political Journal [in Russian, Русский Вестник-Литературный и Политический журнал] between 1879 and 1880. The complete novel was published in a separate edition in 1880. Set in 19th-century Russia, *The Brothers Karamazov* is a philosophical novel that delves into questions of God, free will, and morality.
- 14 This quote is taken from Dostoevsky’s “The Grand Inquisitor,” a poem contained within the text of his novel *The Brothers Karamazov*. “The Grand Inquisitor” is recited by the character Ivan Karamazov, who questions his brother Aleksey, a novice monk, about the possibility of a personal and benevolent God. Among other beliefs, the Grand Inquisitor defends the idea that you need only give man bread and control his conscience to rule the world.
- 15 Slavophilia was a 19th-century **intellectual** movement that considered western Europe, which had adopted the Roman Catholic and Protestant religions, as morally bankrupt. The Russian people, by contrast, adhered to the Russian Orthodox faith and thus, through their common faith and church, they were united in a “Christian community.” Among its leaders were Aleksey S. Khomyakov, the brothers Konstantin S. and Ivan S. Aksakov, the brothers Ivan V. and Pyotr V. Kireyevsky, and Yuri F. Samarin. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Slavophile>
- 16 Aleksey Stepanovich Khomyakov was a 19th century Russian religious writer whose ideas revolved around the notion of “sobornost,” (in Russian, соборность) or “catholicity.” Khomyakov believed that sobornost called for “cooperation within the Russian Christian community or ‘obshchina’ [In Russian, община], united by a set of common convictions and Orthodox Christian values, as opposed to the cult of individualism in the West.” <https://www.definitions.net/definition/sobornost> and <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Slavophile>
- 17 N. A. Narochitskaya, a Russian historian known for her radical conservatism and support of Russian military action in the Chechen wars, and opposition to NATO action in the for-

Christian virtue “in the name of the Father and the Son of the Holy Spirit.”

- 9) If so, in Orthodoxy, the whole truth of freedom having been given to man is preserved but the chaos that comes with it is overcome. Orthodoxy does not need “solitude” for some “self-absorbed development of a personal basis.” The Russian Orthodox path is healing—it assumes that social contradictions are resolved not by forcibly imposing happiness on humanity (consumerism, hedonism, success, egalitarian progressivism), but by reconciling everyone and everything in the bosom of the Church. The Orthodox “sobornost” consciousness “churchifies” life in Christ. It is this positive ideal that inspired the thinker, Dostoevsky, and which he understood not as the external subordination of all life to the Church (as Catholicism represents), but as the free and internal assimilation of Christian principles in life in all its forms of being. Russian universal humanity gives rise to the fulfillment of Christ’s precepts on earth. Through repentance, man has returned to

the God-ethical transfigured self. The deeper a person has fallen, the greater the feat of his moral resurrection. Suffering in atonement for the sin and evil committed. If it is perceived sincerely and deeply, freely manifested and truly suffered, moral healing is possible. Such are the spiritual tablets of the Russian national worldview.

- 10) The Russian traditional-religious model that shapes the worldview was based on the absolute opposition of the poles of good and evil. Russian consciousness is extreme—“all or nothing.” It does not like the middle-ground (where there is gray devilry), it is uncompromising in its essence. Compromise is seen as being unprincipled, lacking the ability to show will or stand on one’s own beliefs. There is no “golden mean” in pragmatics, no expediency. Separating freedom from the Cross—“a sinful paradise”—is a moral collapse for the Russian consciousness which is unclouded by the revisionism of adaptation. The primordial purity of Orthodoxy is doomed to “competition with the Latins.”¹⁸ For the “believing

mer Yugoslavia. In numerous interviews, Narochnitskaya has claimed “that the West wants to subjugate Russia, impose its rules on it, even ‘dismember’ it. She is often seen on state TV channels corroborating Putin’s claims that the opposition movement in Russia is funded by coordinated by the NATO nations.” <https://www.interpretermag.com/gay-slavs-are-better-than-gay-teutons/> and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natalya_Narochnitskaya

- 18 “Competition with the Latins” refers to an 11th century essay directed against Catholics. Although Metropolitan of Kiev Georgiy Grek is considered to be the author of this work, many researchers consider this attribution to be incorrect. Metropolitan Georgiy, who arrived in Rus’ from Byzantium in around 1062, is believed to have sat on the metropolitan throne from 1062 to 1073. https://dic-academic.ru.translate.google/dic.nsf/ruwiki/1642334?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=op,sc and <https://dic-academic.ru.translate.google/dic.nsf/ruwiki/12>

mind” is truly God-believing and free in the Cross. Orthodoxy recognizes itself as genuine, unreformed Christianity, while the reformation of Catholicism unwittingly gave rise to the revolutionization of the consciousness of Europeans. The mission of Orthodoxy is to protect the spirit in pristine moral purity, and the world order in Divine harmony with truth and justice.

Western/European ideologies forced upon Russia have weakened it; Russia must return to its roots

- 11) For the Russian “sobornost” consciousness, not only are Western fundamental and ideological innovations unacceptable, but also the “antichrist” reforms of Emperor Peter the Great: For their ruthlessness, Peter was called the “first Bolshevik.” Despite all the technological benefits to the Fatherland, he inflicted irreparable harm on the Russian people: he abolished the patriarchate, subordinated the Church to the state, and “suspended” Russian

holiness. Having cut a window into Europe, he broke with Russian conservative tradition, muddled its identity, and changed the national code. His issue with the “beard”¹⁹ obliterated the conservative “long-haired” norm and caused a regression, which led to the destruction of the traditional Russian hierarchy of values. Let him then strengthen imperial sovereignty—a trait borrowed from Europe. “He wanted,” as the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted, “first to create Germans and British, when he should have started by creating Russians. He prevented his subjects from ever becoming what they could be.”²⁰ Emperor Peter I decided to transform Russia into a Holland (even the current flag in the Russian Federation is that same alien tricolor) at the cost of turning the state “into a plaything for endless changes” which led to revolution. From the standpoint of a conservative vision, he undermined the “spirit of the people,” that is, the very foundations of an autocracy, the very moral power

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- 19 Eschner, Kat. (2017, September 5). Why Peter the Great Established a Beard Tax. *Smithsonian Magazine*. In his attempts to modernize Russia, Peter the Great endeavored to get Russians to go beardless like “modern” Western Europeans. After shaving his own beard off, he declared that all men in Russia had to lose theirs. This was a massively unpopular policy with many including the Russian Orthodox church which considered the practice blasphemous. Ultimately the tsar allowed people to opt to keep their beards by imposing a beard tax. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/why-tsar-peter-great-established-beard-tax-180964693/>
- 20 This quote is taken from Book 8, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1762 treatise, “The Social Contract” [In French, “Du contrat social”]. Here Rousseau theorizes about “the best way to establish a political community in the face of the problems of commercial society... [The work] helped inspire political reforms or revolutions in Europe...[arguing] against the idea that monarchs were divinely empowered to legislate...[and] that only the people, who are sovereign, have that all-powerful right.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Social_Contract

of the state. In connection with this, historian N. M. Karamzin, in the *Note On Ancient and New Russia*, stated: “With the acquisition of human virtues, we have lost civil ones . . . We became citizens of the world, but ceased to be, in some cases, citizens of Russia. Blame Peter.”²¹

- 12) Karamzin blames Peter for many things, and most importantly, the creation of a Europeanized ruling stratum, which, in fact, ceased to be Russian. He blames him for the gigantic, painful socio-cultural split, the gap between the top and the bottom. “His accusation of Peter for the creation of a socio-cultural abyss between the top and the bottom, was fraught with the likelihood of revolution. And this imputation

was, perhaps, one of the main bonds underpinning Russian conservative ideology until 1917. And even after,” historian Arkady Monaco states, Peter “denationalized the upper social layer. Made it cosmopolitan. This meant that they were of little use for solving the problems that Russians and Russia faced.”²²

- 13) How did Russia return to itself—to its root archaic religion? The ancient Russian fundamental, “unwavering” pantheism,²³ which considered existence as an ontologization of the moral outlook on the world, nevertheless gave way to an “innovative” path of development. In post-Decembrist Russia,²⁴ the “disintegration phase” (the theory of ethnogenesis of Lev Gumilyov²⁵)

21 Nikolay Mikhailovich Karamzin is a Russian historian and writer who, in 1803, was given the title of historiographer by Tsar Aleksandr I. In 1811, he submitted his “Note on Ancient and New Russia,” which contained a biting critique of the policies of the Tsar but vindicated autocracy and serfdom. He is considered a founder of 18th/19th-century Russian imperial conservatism. <https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/historians-european-biographies/nikolai-mikhailovich-karamzin>

22 Minakov, Arkady. (2018, July 5). Voronezh Historian Arkady Monaco: The Cult of the West as a Sickness of Russian Civilization. *Four Pens-The Voronezh Independent Socio-Political Portal*. [In Russian, “Воронежский историк Аркадий Минаков: Западничество как болезнь русской цивилизации.”] http://4pera.com/news/history/voronezhskiy_istorik_arkadiy_minakov_zapadnichestvo_kak_bolezn_russkoy_tsivilizatsii/

23 Panteism refers to a philosophical doctrine that identifies God with the universe or regards the universe as a manifestation of God. It can also refer to worship that admits or tolerates all gods.

24 The Decembrist uprising refers to a December 1825 revolt staged by Russian imperial army officers, influenced by European intellectual trends, who led approximately three thousand Russian soldiers in an attempt to implement a liberal political program. With the failure of the Decembrists, Russia’s monarchical absolutism continued for another century. For details, see https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Decembrist_Revolt

25 Titov, Alexander Sergeevich. (March 2005). Lev Gumilev, Ethnogenesis and Eurasianism. *University College London, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies*. pp. 2, 60, 122. According to Titov, “Gumilev’s account of Russian history focused on a distinction between Kievan Rus and Muscovite Russia, the role of the Mongols in the formation of the Russian ethnos, and the interpretation of Russian history in terms of phases of ethnogenesis.” Titov explains further that Gumilev’s “ethnos” referred to “a group of people who had a stable common culture and

of Russian integrity began. Under Pushkin, “the end came to that ‘organic’ Russia, whose monument was erected in Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*. Then the Russian spirit was driven underground or banished to a foreign land,” writes Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. Panchenko.²⁶ Morality is truth—the leitmotif of the revivalist “characteristically Russian” prose of life—the life “of those in the village.” The voice of Prince Shcherbatov²⁷ from the 18th century *On the Damage to Morals in Russia* sounds like a serious warning to contemporaries about a perniciousness of reform that is alien to the nation. He rightly believed that the morals of pre-Petrine Russia were healthier and more suitable for the “preservation of the people,” and that it would be better to do without reforms

altogether. If the church spiritual backbone of the people and imperial sovereignty had not been strong, then Russia would not have had to be broken over the knee twice in the 20th century alone—first by the Bolshevik-Leninists, then by the anti-Bolshevik Yeltsinites. And today, Russia is intent on a complete restoration of its integrity and imperial self-identification.

Russia’s geopolitical presence has waned; NATO expansion has magnified the threat

14) A permanent conflict of civilizations has become a pre-war confrontation. Russia, as the English historian A. Toynbee²⁸ defines its modern-day fateful moment, is resisting the implanting of someone else’s “civilizational wedge.” Even without

could assume any social form, from a tribe to a state.” Gumilev maintained that “by looking at people’s lives and attitudes at a particular time in the history of an ethnos, it was possible to determine which phase of ethnogenesis was at work. Here Dr. Vertlieb is making reference to the third phase of ethnogenesis—named variously as the “disintegration” or “break down” or “crisis” phase. According to Gumilev, this phase begins with unsuccessful attempts at a reform of social institutions, followed by civil wars and behavioural splits in the superethnos. <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1446515/1/U602440.pdf>

- 26 Panchenko’s words are taken from the Foreword to Dr. Vertlieb’s book (1992) *От Загоскина до Шукшина: опыт непредвзятого размышления*, Библиотека ‘Звезды’, СПб, 403 стр., ISBN 5718300453, 9785718300451. [In English, *From Zagoskin to Shukshin: An Unbiased Reflection*], Zvezdy Library, St. Petersburg, 403 Pages.
- 27 Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Shcherbatov (1733-1790) was a leading ideologue and proponent of the Russian Enlightenment. Shcherbatov’s essay “On the Damage of Morals in Russia” sharply criticized the policy of the government and the customs of the court environment where he served as a historiographer and publicist.
- 28 Sokolov, S. V. (2011, 21 December). *Conflict of Christian and Islamic Civilizations in the 21st Century*. Medina Publishing House. <http://idmedina.ru/books/materials/?3708>. Here Dr. Vertlieb is paraphrasing the words of English historian, author, and specialist on international affairs, Arnold J. Toynbee, words which, according to the Sokolov article, are found in Toynbee’s work (1949, January 1) *Civilization on Trial*. Oxford University Press. 263 Pages. ASIN: B0007K8VCM.

Newton's law, it is clear the counter-active force exerted by the Russians should theoretically be no weaker than the force of influence on them. However, the fact that the countries of Eastern Europe have been coopted into the North Atlantic Alliance²⁹ almost unhindered by the Russian Federation speaks of the passivism of Russian foreign policy and the absence of strategic parity between the antagonists. Russia's geopolitical space is rapidly shrinking, like Balzac's *Wild Ass Skin*.³⁰ The West has moved close to the borders of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin's "Red Line" has signaled the danger.³¹

- 15) As the political scientist S. Huntington rightly argues, "the fault lines between civilizations are the lines of future fronts."³² Isn't that why, in 1945, American General George

Patton drove his army without respite to meet the Russians—to prevent Marshal Georgy Zhukov from occupying all of Europe at that time? If then, the "inter-civilizational fault line" ran near the German city of Torgau on the Elbe River—now [the line runs all of] a few minutes of missile flight time even from Romania, let alone from Poland. And if Ukraine enters NATO, the West will decrease its flight time to the Russian Federation to as few as 5 to 7 "missile" minutes to reach Moscow! In order to avoid the worst-case scenario, on December 17, 2021, the Kremlin demanded *a written* guarantee that the military development of Ukraine would stop, and that NATO's entire military infrastructure would move back to 1997 positions.³³ To put it another way: it has

29 The United Nations classifies Eastern Europe as including 10 countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Current Eastern European members of NATO, then, include 7 of the 10 Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

30 Written by French novelist and playwright Honore de Balzac in 1831, *The Wild Ass's Skin* [in French, *La Peau de chagrin*] tells the story of a young man who discovers a piece of wild ass's skin which has the magical property of granting wishes. However, the fulfillment of the wisher's desire comes at a cost: after each wish, the skin shrinks and consumes the physical energy of the wisher. https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/99742.The_Wild_Ass_s_Skin

31 Seddon, Max; Foy, Henry; Williams, Aime. (2021, December 17) "Russia publishes 'red line' security demands for NATO. US: Moscow blames alliance for 'hostile acts' as tension simmers over military build-up near Ukraine." *Financial Times*. According to the article, "Russia...published a set of stringent demands...which would end all prospect of Ukraine or any more former Soviet states joining the transatlantic alliance...." Further, the article states that according to Putin, "[the demands] are needed to insulate Russia from the threat of attack." <https://www.ft.com/content/493da5ea-6ef2-42cc-8be1-c725030cf839>

32 Huntington, Samuel P. (Summer 1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 72(3), 22-49. In the article, American political scientist argues that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world and that future wars would be fought not between countries, but between cultures.

33 Meyer, Henry and Arkhipov, Ilya. (2021, December 17). Russia Demands NATO Pullback in Security Talks with U.S. *Bloomberg News*. According to the article, "Russia demanded that

proposed [that NATO] capitulate in a war that has not yet begun. In the ancient treatise *The Art of War* by the Chinese commander Sun Tzu, it is said, “Battles and the seizing of territory cannot be considered the highest skill of military operations; the highest skill is forcing the surrender of the enemy army without a fight.”

- 16) It is unlikely that the collective West would agree to surrender. After all, “Russia is very much inferior to NATO both in terms of human and industrial resources as well as in terms of the total power of its weapons,” military expert B. Yulin³⁴ maintains. That is, unless there is something that equalizes the offensive forces of both parties—like the hypersonic weapons and powerful nuclear arsenal that the Russian

Federation possesses. The Russian Federation is not the USSR, which threatened, in case of force majeure, to use the plan of Academician A. D. Sakharov—to create a “strait named after Stalin” between Canada and Mexico.³⁵ For the sake of business, the Russian Federation has been filling the tanks of “independent [Ukraine]” with Russian fuel. And only when everything “became tangled up” into a Gordian knot was the Russian Federation “forced to do something” (V. Putin’s words). But if it were not for the risk to the interests of the ruling oligarchy in the Russian Federation, the Kremlin would hardly have resorted to the daring rhetoric of war—a warning about “adequate military-technical measures” in case of force majeure.³⁶

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization roll back almost a quarter-century of expansion by withdrawing forces from eastern Europe and halt further growth....” <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-17/russia-demands-nato-return-to-1997-in-security-treaty-proposals>

- 34 Abramov, Nikolai. (2021, November 12). Historian Yulin assesses the risk of a military conflict between Russia and NATO [Russian title: “Историк Юлин оценил риск военного конфликта между Россией и НАТО”]. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/11/12/n_16842907.shtml
- 35 The phrase “Comrade Stalin Strait” was coined by the father of the Russian hydrogen bomb, Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov, a Soviet nuclear physicist, dissident, Nobel laureate, and activist for disarmament, peace, and human rights. Sakharov posited a number of hypothetical plans for launching a preemptive strike against the United States. One proposed detonating 50- to 100-megaton thermonuclear charges just off the two coasts of the U.S. The result would be giant tsunamis that would essentially wash away the United States to form the Stalin Strait between Canada and Mexico. See (2018, 17 March) “The Comrade Stalin Strait — Truth and Fiction” [original in Russian: “Пролив им. Товарища Сталина» правда и вымысел”]. <https://fishki.net/anti/2539769-proliv-im-tovariwa-stalina-pravda-i-vymysel.html> and (28 January 2022) “The Stalin Strait and other miracles of Andrey Sakharov” [original in Russian: “Пролив имени Сталина и другие чудеса Андрея Сахарова”]. https://sptoday.ru/2021_12_24/proliv-imeni-stalina-i-drugie-chudes-a-andreya-saxarova/
- 36 Ilyushina, Mary. (2021, December 22). Putin threatens ‘retaliatory military-technical’ measures as standoff with U.S. and NATO over Ukraine escalates. *CBS News*. According to the

The need for a national ideology that centers on Russian Orthodox-Soviet values

17) Faced with a deadly challenge to the very sovereignty of its existence, Russia needed an official ideology of containment and revenge. “We want Russia to have an official ideology based on the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church—an ideology that is adhered to no matter what.³⁷ We want this ideology to be the only—or at least the main—basis for the foreign policy of the Russian State”—the will of patriotic Constantinople.³⁸ Western analysts even came up with a name for this ideologeme—“strategic conservatism.”

18) But the Kremlin is only flirting with Russian nationalism; it is afraid (like the liberal West) of its full implementation. The Russian people, on the other hand, need Russia to pull itself away from its “neutral”

drifting pattern and make a shift from its “universal” demagoguery back to the Russian religious root meanings of its imperial existence. This way it would be able to achieve a reconciliation of its national Russian identity—the foundation of the Russian state. The Russia that was a great power is being rebuilt with a great sense of urgency, its greatness based on its historical traditions: the ideas of having a special path, an identity, sovereignty, and a specialness peculiar to Russian civilization (as the poet said: “It has a specialness: You can only believe in Russia”).³⁹ The domestic and international landscape is being adjusted in accordance with Orthodox-Soviet values.

19) Thanks to the Kremlin’s advancing of its own brand of “strategic conservatism,” according to the experts of the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies,⁴⁰ it seeks to achieve the following goals:

piece, Russian president Putin warned that if the U.S. and NATO do not halt what Moscow considers aggressive actions along the country’s border with Ukraine, Russia would respond with “retaliatory military-technical” measures. Further, Putin emphasized that “we have every right to do so.” <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-retaliatory-military-technical-measures/>

37 In Dr. Vertlieb’s original Russian text, he uses an Old Church Slavonic turn of phrase meaning, very loosely, “come hell or high water” or “no matter what happens,” [in Russian, *иже не преjdeши*].

38 Here Dr. Vertlieb’s original Russian text refers to the city of Constantinople by its ancient Russian name—Tsargrad [in Russian, *Царьград*] or “Tsar’s City.”

39 Taken from an 1866 poem by poet Fyodor Tyutchev: “You can’t understand Russia with the mind//You can’t measure it with a common yardstick://It has a specialness—//In Russia you can only believe.” [In Russian: *Умом Россию не понять//Аршином общим не измерить://У ней особенная стать—//В Россию можно только верить*».] https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Fyodor_Tyutchev

40 Conley H., Ruy D., Stefanov, R., and Vladimirov, M. (2019, May 1). *The Kremlin Playbook*

- Reduce pro-Western sentiment in target countries;
- Strengthen support for Russian political actions (at home and abroad) and legitimize the Kremlin’s narratives;
- Undermine support for EU membership among Member States and reduce support for EU and NATO membership in candidate countries;
- Keep the countries of the post-Soviet space in Russia’s sphere of influence;
- Undermine internal cohesion, sovereignty, and possibly territorial integrity in a way that supports the interests of the Kremlin (e.g., Bosnia);
- Remove or weaken the leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (which is seen as preventing the unification of the Orthodox world under Russian leadership); and,
- Lift sanctions (collateral and long-term benefits) and push Western governments to take Russia’s political interests into account.

20) According to Western analysts, this is what the “arrows on the offensive map” of the new Russian ideology—“strategic conservatism”—look

like. Time will tell: Is Russia really “concentrating” on its overdue national revival under the ancient guiding banners of Christ as a “symbol of victory over death and the devil,” and not doing so in vain for the sake of an immediate gain (to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and to successfully predict the result of the current competition for succession to the throne—the 2024 presidential election)?

21) For Russia, the primary task is to restore its original geopolitical “code” in terms of its worldview, which is a set of key ideas that Russians believe about their place in history and the world, their foreign policy strategy, and their national priorities. The Russians are trying to take the Chinese approach to politics: Without fail, in all agreements, the Chinese require “duiden”—parity in relations, measures, and steps. In accordance with the spiritual concept of “yin and yang” (“chaos and order”), they require a ranking of the entities involved—and an end to any chaotic activity. This approach is evident in Russia’s requirement for NATO to return to its pre-1997 positions—before the beginning of the alliance’s self-propulsion towards expansion—[and Russia’s demands] to prevent the West from its military coopting of Ukraine—to

2. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 116 Pages. ISBN-10: 144281111. ISBN-13: 978-1442281110. For additional information, see also Conley H., Mina, J., Stefanov, R., and Vladimirov, M. (October 27, 2016) *The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe*. (CSIS Reports) Paperback, 86 Pages. ISB-10: 1442279583, ISBN-13: 978-1442279582.

observe the “red lines” of the Russian Federation. And for this, Russia needs a parity of forces with the West, achievable by possessing, as a retaliatory counterthreat, an asymmetric mega-weapon capable of destroying the United States and Europe—as well as an accompanying conservative-value ideology of Russian victory.

- 22) Genuine conservative values are like a locomotive’s flywheel, its source of power. They are necessary for any social system in order for it to prevent an ultra-liberal “maidanism”⁴¹ from destroying the very machinery of the state. There is a fierce outbreak of ethnic nationalism taking place. Chauvinism has inflated this hate to the point that there is loathing for another people simply for what they are (Trumpists, Russians). It has the hallmarks of an impending coup d’état in the USA, even a second civil war. There is a change underway heading in the direction of a one-party system (with all its medieval “Soviet” consequences: “who is not with us is against us”) — a trend towards left-fascist-leaning socialism. The political camps are still the same: the left (sinistram)—the sinful, bad—and the right

(iustum)—the true, correct. The right, being more conservative, has relied on traditional American ethics: individualism, self-sufficiency, hard work, independence from the state, being law-abiding, and possessing equal rights before the law. The left, with its Marxist views, has been drawn to social values: collectivism, herding, subordination to superiors, the primacy of the state over the individual, and economic equality. These two approaches have manifested themselves in the two parties: the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. So far, Antifa and the BLM, under the slogan “Down with the Police,” are the manifestations of a barricade-free pluralism of societal orientations.

- 23) The language of political correctness is “newspeak” à la George Orwell: robbery has become “redistribution of wealth”; a black criminal has become “a victim of racism”; talent has become “white privilege”; “white” has come to mean “racist.” “We,” as J. Fraden⁴² states, “are waiting for the Second Civil War. It will be the only way to save the country. It will not only be necessary, but also legal. Let me remind you that for this reason, 244 years ago, the

41 “The Maidan Uprising was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on 21 November 2013 with large protests in “Maidan Nezalezhnosti” [In Ukrainian, Independence Square] The protests were sparked by the Ukrainian government’s sudden decision not to sign the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement, instead choosing closer ties to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union.” <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euromaidan>

42 Jacob Fraden is an electronic engineer, inventor, entrepreneur, educator, artist, and writer. He has authored short stories in Russian and is a contributor to the on-line blog “American Thinker”—a daily online magazine dealing with American politics from a politically conservative viewpoint.

U.S. Founding Fathers wrote in the Declaration of Independence: “But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.” The Russian national consciousness, which was damaged twice, in 1917 and 1991, also yearns for a conservative restoration of the “olden times.”

- 24) Everything comes full circle. As the Eurasianist Pyotr Savitsky argued, “no matter who would have won the Civil War—the ‘whites’ or the ‘reds’—all the same, Russia would be opposing the West, all the same it would be a great power, all the same

would be creating a Great Empire.”⁴³ If that is so, then the neo-Byzantine model of statehood is fitting for the creation of Eurasian Russia based on a combination of the religious values of Orthodoxy and the values of the Empire, headed by an Autocrat (as an option, someone with those functions, be it a Leader or General Secretary).

- 25) The concept of Alexander Prokhanov’s “Fifth Empire” is based⁴⁴ on the Byzantine “symphony of authorities,”⁴⁵ where the Church and the monarchy/“leader of the people” closely cooperate in a single social liturgical work—universal salvation. May Monomakh’s “state of truth”⁴⁶ shine—the triumph of justice, salvation, goodness. True conservatism can only be the faithful

43 “Petr Savitsky was a Russian pioneer of the so-called ‘structural geography,’ and was the first to propose...a geopolitical vision of ‘Eurasia,’ an entity which...is neither Europe nor Asia, but the ‘place of development’ of the Russian Empire...” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/298446006_Russia-Eurasia_according_to_Savitsky

44 Yasmann, Victor. (2006, November 3). Russia: The Fiction and Fact Of Empire. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcast* (13:20 GMT): “The book *Symphony of The Fifth Empire*, is a collection of essays calling on Russia’s elite, liberals, and patriots alike to unite to construct a new Eurasian empire—a successor to the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia.” In discussing his work, Prokhanov states, “One can see signs of an emerging empire almost everywhere...in events such as the building of new types of ships and submarines...launching the new ‘Bulova’ missile...or the construction of the North European Gas Pipeline.”

45 Poliantseva, A. V. (2016). “Symphony” of the Authorities in Byzantium, and in Russia as the Successor of the Byzantine Empire. [In Russian: “Симфония” властей в Византии и России как преемницы византийской империи] *Polythematic Online Scientific Journal of Kuban State Agrarian University*. According to the article, “The Byzantine ‘symphony of authorities’ refers to the fact that in Byzantium, the authority of the Emperor played a major role in strengthening the Orthodox Church. The Church...developed and highlighted the official doctrine of the divine origin of the Imperial power. [Therefore] in the Byzantine Empire a perfect model of Church-state relations—a ‘Symphony of the authorities’ was formed.” A dual-language version can be found at <http://ej.kubagro.ru/2016/04/pdf/99.pdf>

46 Vladimir Monomakh was a 12th century Grand Prince of Kiev revered for his institution of legal reforms which helped to establish a “state of truth”—rule of law—that extended legal protections to the lower-class.

preservation of the Divine Truth, and not the opportunistic tasks of the ruling “elite.” The state and the Church are united only if they fulfill a common root national mission—that together with the people, they carry out their own transformation and the transformation of the world. Metropolitan Hilarion predicts a great spiritual future for the Russians, applying to it the truth found in the gospel that “the last shall be first.”

- 26) The “stern face” of Russian imperial conservatism gets unfairly disparaged, with detractors likening it to “Stalinist Satanism” and classifying Putin and Dugin’s “Eurasian” projects⁴⁷ as “right-wing extremist intellectualism in a neo-authoritarian Russia.” “Hyperconservatism” is generally a boogeyman for liberals.

“Ultimately,” political scientist A. Malashenko asserts, “this ‘hyper’ leads to the collapse of the state, quite possibly pressured by the anger from the street and under the battering of extremism.”⁴⁸ Historian A. Minakov also believes that conservatism in Russia always correlates with a strong, centralized, powerful hierarchical leadership structure. For in Russian conditions, only such a power can provide the mobilization of both material and human resources needed to conduct numerous wars. Survival is possible only with an extremely powerful centralized power, perceived by the people as a blessing and identified with what is now called the civilizational code. The essential values behind Russia’s fundamental, spiritual system for preserving its way of life are an inextricably linked variation

47 Dixon Klump, Sarah. (2017, March 17). Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. *Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Kennan Institute*. “Eurasianism rejects the view that Russia is on the periphery of Europe, and on the contrary interprets the country’s geographic location as grounds for a kind of messianic ‘third way.’” Further, according to Eurasianist Alexander Dugin, “Geography, not economics, is the pivotal cause of world power, and Russia, by its intrinsic physical location, [provides] a prime global role.” The article goes on to say, “Dugin argued that Eurasian empire will be constructed on the basis of denying the common enemy, the USA and its liberal values.... The rigour of Dugin’s influence in Russia has seen a steeping increase under Putin’s rule...[however] many scholars have argued that Dugin’s sway over Putin is highly overstated. In fact, there is no plausible evidence to show a direct link between Putin and Dugin, but the palpable ideological similarities shown by both of them regarding specific issues denote that Dugin has left some influence over Vladimir Putin’s mind.” For information on Eurasianism and Dugin, respectively, see <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-eurasianism-ideology-empire> and Amarasinghe, Punsara. (2020, April 8) Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism in Putin’s Russia. *Modern Diplomacy* online at <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/04/08/alexanders-dugins-neo-eurasianism-in-putins-russia/>

48 Interestingly, in 2017, in an online Belarusian discussion forum, political scientist and historian Aleksey Malashenko asserted that “without liberal influence, conservatism will turn into obscurantism that is disastrous for society, while liberalism, without regard for its opponent, will ‘enrage,’ and its radicalism will acquire extremist features.... Liberalism and conservatism must ‘sing a duet.”” <https://politring.com/region/906-aleksey-malashenko-konservativizm-i-liberalizm-mogut-pet-tolko-duetom.html>

of the triad Spirituality, Sovereignty, and Sobornost⁴⁹—the content make-up of the “Russian idea.”

- 27) The church schism of the 17th century violated the integrity of this Triad. A sharp conflict arose between the secular and spiritual authorities which ended with the assertion of the primacy of the tsar’s power over the power of the patriarch. Arch-priest Avvakum did not change the ways of the Old Believers (such as the use of two fingers in rites and in the sign of the cross). His zealous adherence to tradition was inherited by the guardians/poshvenniks/conservatives⁵⁰—supporters of unreformed Orthodoxy.

- 28) Putin’s understanding of conserv-

atism is not that of Admiral A. S. Shishkov,⁵¹ who was one of the first to talk about the fact that the westernized Russian upper class had turned into a sort of special group of people living within the confines of a large population which has preserved genuine Russian values. While maintaining the gap in the Russian Federation between the “gold yacht Russians” and the “down-and-out” ones, a mortal battle of the “two Russias” cannot be ruled out—a battle between the original “projections” [for Russia] by the liberals/Westerners and by the conservatives/custodians of “imperial aspirations.” I expressed this premonition of a collision in my article “Overcoming Systemic Threats to Russia’s National Security”.⁵²

49 In Russian religious philosophy, “sobornost” (in Russian, соборность) refers to a spiritual community marked by a free spiritual unity in both the group’s church and secular life. Khomyakov emphasized the unity of the Orthodox church which he juxtaposed with protestant individualism, or the “cult of individualism,” found in the West. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sobornost> and <https://iphlib.ru/library/collection/newphilenc/document/HASH0178cc6530a5c64973161178/>

50 The “guardians” here refer to those who adhere to the following belief: “One of the main concepts that made up the philosophy of Orthodox conservatism is the religious and political doctrine ‘Moscow is the Third Rome,’ which was the core of Orthodox conservatism.” The “pochvenniki” [почвенники]—derived from the Russian word “pochva” [Russian: “почва” or “soil”]—refers to those who, like the Slavophiles of the 1860s, advocate for a merging of the educated class with the people (“soil”). See *Church and State in the Views of Russian Conservatives of the 19th Century. Religion in conservative public thought*. https://www.allistoria-ru.translate.google/allis-488-6.html?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc

51 A. S. Shishkov (17154-1841) was a Russian writer and statesman whose intense nationalistic and religious sentiments made him a precursor of the Slavophile movement. He retired in disagreement with the early liberal reforms of Alexander I. Devoting himself to the promotion of Russian patriotism, he became a self-styled philologist, insisting that the Russian language be purged of foreign, especially French, influence. He was the author of “Discourse on Love for One’s Country.” <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksandr-Semyonovich-Shishkov>

52 Vertlieb, Evgeny. (2007, February 3). Overcoming systemic threats to Russia’s national security [“Преодоление системных угроз национальной безопасности России.”]. Original Russian article published by the online newspaper “Forum.msk.ru.” <https://forum-msk.org/>

“Speaking of the national security of modern post-Belovezhskaya Russia,⁵³ it needs to be clarified which of the two currently existing ‘Russias’ is under discussion. After all, the liberal pandemonium of the 1990s smashed the country into two unequal opposing ‘Russias’—the oligarchic-mafia Russia and the Russia of the destitute. The fatherland, spiritually taken over and plundered by unjust privatization, has been actually split into the fiefdom of the super-rich and the pitiful existence of the destitute majority. Society has been torn into two antagonistic camps. Accordingly, each of these structures has its own set of ideological and worldview criteria for the truth, different needs, incomparable challenges and threats, prospects for the future, and scenarios for the strategic development of the country.”

29) And just recently, V. Putin proposed

material/society/20484.html

his draft for a new state ideology—“healthy conservatism.” Sociologist Karl Mannheim⁵⁴ believes that a special ideology was needed—one that serves to protect a defined political or social order from the external and internal challenges that threaten it. A discussion of the steps for creating a new state ideology follows.

30) The Belovezhskaya conspiracy, the Search for the “Russian Idea” in the Post-Soviet Era, and the steps for creating a new state ideology

31) The Belovezhskaya conspiracy destroyed the Soviet Union [and initiated] the newest phase of Russian history—first in the community of the CIS,⁵⁵ and then in the form of a broken-down, de-sovereign-ed, comatose Russian Federation—one that shone with the Shchedrin delight of the Foolovites⁵⁶ who freed themselves from themselves. (And

53 Belovezha refers to the Belovezha Accords that ended the Soviet Union and established the Commonwealth of Independent States. See (2016, December 7) “History in the Making: The Agreement That Ended the Soviet Union.” *The Moscow Times*. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/12/07/history-in-the-making-the-agreement-that-ended-the-soviet-union-a56456>

54 In the view of German Sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), social conflict is caused by the diversity in thoughts and beliefs (ideologies) among major segments of society that derive from differences in social location. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Karl-Mannheim>

55 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [in Russian, Содружество Независимых Государств (СНГ)] is a regional intergovernmental organization in Eastern Europe and Asia. When the USSR began to fall in 1991, the founding republics signed the Belavezha Accords, declaring that the Soviet Union would cease to exist and proclaimed the CIS in its place. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States

56 This is a reference to the 19th Century satirical novel by Russian author M. Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin, *History of One Town* [История одного города]. The work is a farcical history of “Stupid Town” (Russian: Глупов) that follows the lives of “bungling” Russian “StupidTown-ites” (Russian: Глуповцы) for hundreds of years as they endure the violence and lunacy of their tyrannical rulers.

now, June 12th—as of 1994—has become the official holiday for celebrating the “independence of Russia.” But independence from what? Was it a colony? Independence from the USSR?) The fatherland, torn apart in the “dashing 90s” by “criminal revolutionaries” (“the great criminal revolution” — the term used by film director S. S. Govorukhin⁵⁷), was deprived of the ideology of the “Soviet Union”⁵⁸ (the Red Empire), by the implementation of the 13th Article of the Constitution of the Russian Federation which prohibits the establishment of any ideology—“any state ideology or any ideology at all that is mandatory.” The comprador oligarchy ruling the Russian Federation was quite satisfied with the established collaborative-corporate system of the “pipe economy” with

the policy of the “gas at a discount” agreement.⁵⁹

32) But by God’s providence and Putin’s efforts, the coup d’état wound up “falling short of the goalpost” (my wording-E.V.). Russia is being reborn from the ashes and ruins. In a situation where there is an escalation in threats and challenges facing the Russian Federation, the issue of creating a national ideology has become relevant, the ideology being a harmonizer of society, an optimizer of the spirit of the people, and a veritable “TNT” of information-organizational weapons for use in the geopolitical confrontation of global national interests.

33) True, the Russian class of bosses certainly has something it can use to eliminate the threat of a “Birch Revolution”⁶⁰ in the Russian

57 “Russian film director Stanislav Govorukhin produced a documentary film about the two years following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991...The movie—also a book by Govorukhin—exposes the ex-Communist officials who became Russia’s *nouveaux riches* by getting a leg up on amassing wealth when Gaidar decontrolled prices, as well as the mafia kingpins who became their fellow travelers to billionairehood through extortion rackets.” See Govorukhin, S. (1993) *The Great Criminal Revolution* [In Russian: Великая криминальная революция]. Andreyevsky Flag Publishers. 126 Pages. ISBN 5856080262. Govorukhin produced a documentary film by the same name which is summarized by Douglas, Rachel. (1994, July 15) “Documentary film on Russian crime is presented in Washington.” *Executive Intelligence Review*, 21(28), 142-145.

58 Here, in Dr. Vertlieb’s original Russian text, he uses a derogatory, slang term for the former Soviet Union— “sovka” [совка].

59 Here, “gas at a discount” is used ironically: In the absence of a real state ideology respected by the people, Russians have to get satisfaction from an ideological surrogate like “discount gas.” Similarly, to gain support of, say, Belarus, the Russian Federation—an anti-people state—has to sell gas cheaply to them. (E.V.)

60 “Birch Revolution” is a term used to refer to a threat to the Kremlin’s power from pro-Western democratic opposition allegedly intending to overthrow Putin (or his protégé in the 2008 presidential election) with financial assistance from Western non-governmental organizations modeled on the “colored revolutions.” The “predicted” revolution never took place. The term “birch revolution” first appeared in 2005 and apparently came from the Russian word for birch [in Russian, *berez* - берёз), a tree that symbolizes Russia. <https://dic-academic.ru>.

Federation. This, as characterized by philosopher Olga Malinova, is a set of “comparatively stable and recognizable systems of meanings.”⁶¹ But this methodology has been compromised: “There was an impact on those lacking any rights by the dictates of other members of society, and the potential became obvious for an ‘abuse of power’ to weaken the competitive chances of opponents up to limiting ideological pluralism by banning the expression of certain ideas in public spaces The ruling elite does not have the right to use state instruments of coercion to impose their own views as binding or to exclude the right to express other points of view.”

“insulting a representative of the authorities” (*Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Article 319*). Such legal purists are terribly far removed from the people. Russia, thrown off the path of its ordinary way of life and even off its civilizational path by the Belovezha putsch,⁶² still cannot fully identify itself and normalize itself under the Law. The project that was created—capitalism with a human face—is a failure in terms of the harmony of the masses: the oligarchy is too greedy for its super-profits, and the authorities too unwilling to earnestly grant “social guarantees” to its citizens. And the USSR-2 project still terrifies the imagination with nightmares of the GULAG.

- 34) From the standpoint of dealing with the irreconcilable opposition, it is true that the State Duma often adopts laws that are akin to laws of war “occupation.” Many forms of public protest have been declared illegal. Take, for example, those calling for fines or forced labor for

- 35) Concerning the question of the interconnectedness of pluralism, state ideology, and personal freedom ... The liberal conservative jurist Boris Chicherin⁶³ considered political freedoms—the right to participate in state power—to be the highest

translate.google.com/dic/nsf/ruwiki/157992?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc

- 61 Olga Malinova, Doctor of Philosophy, is a chief research fellow at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INIO) at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Malinova’s “systems of meanings” refers to a mechanism used by the *nomenklatura* to control who occupies positions of power. For further information, see Dr. Vertlieb’s “Project Putin-2024 in the Geostrategy of Confrontation and Internal Challenges.” *Global Security & Intelligence Studies*. 6(2), Winter 2021, 210.
- 62 “Belovezhskaya putsch” refers to the signing of the Belovezha Accords that ended the Soviet Union and established the Commonwealth of Independent States. See (2016, December 7) “History in the Making: The Agreement That Ended the Soviet Union.” *The Moscow Times*. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/12/07/history-in-the-making-the-agreement-that-ended-the-soviet-union-a56456>
- 63 Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin was a 19th century Russian jurist and political philosopher who proposed the theory that what Russia needed was a strong, authoritative government to persevere—but one with liberal reforms. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Chicherin

development of personal freedom and its only guarantee: “As long as the government is independent of citizens, their rights are not guaranteed to be free from its arbitrariness: in relation to the state, a person is powerless.”⁶⁴ The conservative-liberal concept is more organic—more suited—for taking into account the entire polyphony of the spectrum of different views in society. To harmonize society, the approach used in the cartoonish-Yeltsin demagoguery of Leopold the Cat is clearly not enough: “Guys, let’s live together!”⁶⁵ There is no declared “consensus” of the victims of theft and the thieves—the beneficiaries of the “priKhvatization.”⁶⁶ The blatant social inequality between the “down-and-out class” and the “gold yacht class” is in no way consistent with

the thesis of living in genuine harmony “in accordance with fair justice and the law.”

36) For three decades, the post-Soviet ideosphere had been developing an extreme anti-statism, minimizing of the role of the state and propagandizing a program of godless enrichment instead one of conscience. Such a monstrous shift in the Russian paradigm was codified in the super-presidential Constitution.⁶⁷ Then the undermined strengths of an already minimized and weakened state provoked a series of terrorist attacks from 1991 (Chechnya and Dagestan) to 2004 (Beslan).⁶⁸ But Vladimir Putin then managed to reverse the “harmful megatrend” (regression, deregulation) by strengthening his “vertical

64 Chicherin, Boris Nikolaevich. (1866). Dissertation entitled “On the Representation of the People,” Book 1 “The Being and Properties,” Chapter 1 “Representation and Authority” [Russian: “О народном представительстве,” Книга 1 “Существо и свойства народного представительства,” Глава 1 “Преставительство и полномочие”]. https://www.rcoit.ru/lib/history/narodnoe_predstavitelstvo/18307/

65 “Leopold the Cat is a Russian/Soviet animated series about a cat named Leopold. He is very kind and wants to do only good, but the world is not only good; it is also evil. Two mice are constantly trying to hurt him, but the Leopold always smiles and says, ‘Guys, let’s all live together in harmony! [In Russian, Ребята, давайте жить дружно!].’ The series was produced from 1975 to 1987.” <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1074757/>

66 Dr. Vertlieb coins a word here—“preKhvatization [приХватизация]”—that combines the words for “privatization [приватизация]” and “to seize [приХватить]” with the implication being that the privatization carried out following the dissolution of the USSR was essentially legalized stealing.

67 Amendments to the Russian constitution in 2020 included changes allowing Putin to run again for two more six-year presidential terms as well as conservative amendments such as constitutionally ensuring patriotic education in schools and placing the constitution above international law.

68 The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 was quickly followed by Chechnya declaring its independence. The Beslan school attack refers to the violent takeover of a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, in September 2004 by militants linked to the separatist insurgency in the nearby republic of Chechnya.

of power” and accelerating national self-identification.

- 37) In October 1994, S. Shakhrai and V. Nikonov published the “Conservative Manifesto”⁶⁹—“conservatism with a Russian face.” It contained the main postulates of classical conservatism, supported by quotations from W. Churchill to K. Leontiev. At the same time, an attempt was being made to create an ideological doctrine of “democratic patriotism” (V. Shumeiko, V. Kostikov).⁷⁰ The constituent elements of the “new ideology” centered on the concept of the formation of a political nation of “ethnic Russians” and included: general patriotic rhetoric that included the notion of Russia as a great state; statements about the need to reintegrate post-Soviet space, with the leading role played by Russia as the “first among equals”; and the resurrection of the inspirational phrase “united and indivisible

Russia.” However, the theory of “the new Russian nation” did not take root. But the real-world application of the inspirational phrase “united and indivisible Russia” in “restoring constitutional order in the Chechen Republic” wound up working positively. Russian statehood withstood the separatist challenge from Ichkeria.⁷¹

- 38) The period from 1996 to August 1998, according to historian Sergei Panteleev, was marked by an active search for a “national idea” designed to consolidate society. After a difficult victory in the presidential elections (“Vote or lose!”), which further exacerbated the ideological polarization of Russian society, B. Yeltsin, on July 12, 1996, initiated the process of developing a unified national doctrine by issuing instructions to find out “which national idea, which national ideology was the most important for

69 Classical conservatism was founded by British statesman Edmund Burke and later developed by Russian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries such as Konstantin Leontiev. In post-Soviet Russia, the effort to revive this ideology was undertaken by Vyacheslav Nikonov and Sergey Shakhrai, who co-authored the Conservative Manifesto in 1994. The Manifesto was the ideological basis for activities carried out by the Party for Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) [Партии российского единства и согласия—ПРЕС]. See <https://russia-direct.org/analysis/has-putin-pragmatist-turned-putin-ideologue> and https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Никонов,_Вячеслав_Алексеевич

70 Russian Federation Council V. Shumeiko and press secretary of the President V. Kostikov put forward the doctrine of “democratic patriotism.” The doctrine was included in the President Yeltsin’s 1994 address to the Federal Assembly “On Strengthening the Russian State.” It assumed the formation of a political nation of “[ethnic] Russians,” and proposed that Russia to become the “first among equals” in the Commonwealth of Independent States. https://cyclowiki-org.translate.google/wiki/Государственная_пропаганда_в_России?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc

71 The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is the unrecognized secessionist government of the Chechen Republic. The republic was proclaimed in 1991, which led to two wars with the Russian Federation. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Chechen_Republic_of_Ichkeria

Russia.”⁷² However, the crisis of August 17, 1998—when, for the first time in world history, a state defaulted on domestic debt⁷³—put an end to the socio-economic, political, and ideological course that had been pursued since 1992.

- 39) The stage of development from September 1998 to the end of 1999 was the sublimation of the “*conservative wave*” on the crest of which “Operation Successor” was carried out—the transition of power without any upheaval or revolution. The conservative doctrine of E. Primakov⁷⁴—the strategy of strengthening the country through the construction of a “socially-oriented market with state participation”—met the expectations of the authorities and society. The ideological niche of “enlightened” conservatism (the veiled triad of Count S. S. Uvarov⁷⁵) took

root because of its position on the need for a “national idea” which was understood to mean “patriotism, sovereignty, statehood, and social solidarity.”⁷⁶ But it is one thing to proclaim a conservative-sovereign state course, and another to implement it. As the then gray cardinal of the Kremlin, Vladislav Surkov,⁷⁷ said, “we are, of course, unconditional conservatives, although we don’t know what that is yet.” Conservatism as a fashionable brand: D. Trump defeats H. Clinton (USA); N. Farage—D. Cameron (England); the Five Star Movement⁷⁸—the Brussels Bureaucracy (Italy); V. Orban—the forces personified by D. Soros (Hungary). One issue of the influential magazine *Foreign Affairs* stated that “Nobody in America these days seems to want to be a liberal—or even be known as one.”

72 See (1996, July 13) *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* [Независимая Газета], Page 1.

73 The Russian financial crisis (also called the “ruble crisis” or the “Russian flu”) hit Russia on 17 August 1998. It resulted in the Russian government and Russian Central Bank devaluing the ruble and defaulting on its debt. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_Russian_financial_crisis

74 Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov served as Prime Minister of Russia from 1998-1999, and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996-1998. Yeltsin fired Primakov on 12 May 1999, ostensibly over the sluggish pace of the Russian economy.

75 “In 1832, a slogan was created by Count Sergey S. Uvarov, Minister of Education...that came to represent the official ideology of the imperial government of Nicholas I ... and remained the guiding principle behind government policy during later periods of imperial rule.” See *Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality*. Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orthodoxy-Autocracy-and-Nationality>

76 See (1999, December 30) *Independent Gazette* [Независимая Газета], Page 4.

77 Vladislav Surkov, former Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation, is known in Russia as “the gray cardinal” for his behind-the-scenes political machinations. Surkov, who stage-managed Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, was fired by Putin in February 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/21/putin-fires-vladislav-surkov-puppet-master-russia-ukraine-rebels/>

78 The Five Star Movement is a political party in Italy lead by Giuseppe Conte, former Prime Minister of Italy, from 2018 until 2021.

And the conservative publication *National Review* printed an excerpt from a book by the philosopher J. Hazony under the heading “Liberalism as Imperialism.”⁷⁹ And then in 2018, another book by this author on the same topic, *The Virtue of Nationalism*, was widely declared to be the most important publication of conservative thought since Huntington’s famous book *The Clash of Civilizations*.⁸⁰

Putin’s Brand of Conservatism and Russian Philosophical Underpinnings

Eurasianist Alexander Dugin wrote in a collection of essays entitled *Liberalism is a Threat to Humanity*:⁸¹ “Putin, intuitively seeking to preserve and restore Russia’s sovereignty, came into conflict with the liberal West and its globalization plans but did not formalize this into an alternative ideology either.” Was he really going to “shape” some kind of extensive anti-Western ideology? Hardly. His conflict with the liberal West is not of an antagonistic nature. “Unlike Boris Yeltsin, V. Putin is not a radical. Unlike the Soviet leaders, he is not a dogmatist.”⁸²

40) Such is the trend of the times. And Russia is no exception: It is moving from Westernism to patriotism, from radicalism to conservatism, from “free market” to statism, from ideological nihilism to a single national idea. V. Putin calls his ideology “healthy” or “reasonable” or “moderate” conservatism. Well-known Russian ideologist and

41) Putin’s conservatism is the ideology of preserving society as it is at the moment (of course, that is, with the prospect of immanent development). It is clear: he seeks evolutionary changes but “without creating shockwaves.” Because society is polarized, it is impossible to please both opposing sides. But the president’s choice of whom to please is

79 Hazony, Yoram. (2018, September 6). Liberalism as Imperialism. *National Review*. March 18, 2022. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/09/liberalism-as-imperialism-dogmatic-utopianism-elites-america-europe/> and Hazony’s *The Virtue of Nationalism* (2018, September 4) Basic Books. 304 Pages. ISBN-10: 1541645375 and ISBN-13: 978-1541645370.

80 Huntington, S. (1996). *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon & Schuster (2011, August 2). 368 Pages. ISBN-10: 1451628975 and ISBN-13: 978-1451628975.

81 Dugin, Aleksandr. (2014, April 23). Liberalism is a Threat to Humanity. *Blagodatnyy Ogon’ Provoslavnyy Zhurnal*. [Original published in Russian: Либерализм—угроза человечеству. Благодатный Огонь Православный журнал.] <https://blagogon.ru/biblio/636/print>

82 Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich. (2010). *Vladimir Putin. To Be Continued*. Vremya Publishers. 304 Pages. ISBN: 978-5-9691-0264-4. [Original in Russian: Владимир Путин. Продолжение следует.] According to Medvedev, “Putin is not only a European, but a Westerner as well... pro-market as well as a socialist, a liberal and a conservative who is formulating a new Russian ideology.... He wants to include the sensible ideas from all different modern ideologies and take into account for the new Russia, all the values from its former epochs...including the Soviet era.”

his. His Valdai speech about ideology is based on the “philosophy of inequality” of the philosopher N. Berdyaev.⁸³ But the speech does not say anything about an intention to organize public life to provide justice for each and every member of society. This means that what is actually “conserved” is this: a deliberately unfair structure for Russian society. And it is unrealistic then for such a government to expect love from the people.

- 42) But what has to be taken into account is the reflex reaction of the people—the visceral conservatism of the Russian consciousness. This is a phenomenon of being drawn to tradition, like an “ethnogravitational constant” (my term-E.V.). For example, Dostoevsky’s character Falalei constantly sees a dream about a white bull.⁸⁴ Another

example is from the politician V. S. Chernomyrdin: “Whatever public organization we create, we wind up with the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union].”⁸⁵ And isn’t Russian “conservatism” itself functionally the same? Indeed, in Russian political science, it is synonymous with the concept of the “monarchy” and understood to mean autocracy. Therefore, the “guardianship” of the true values of the Russian root system must, a priori, be pro-imperial, pro-Orthodox, with the primacy of justice, conscience, honor, valor—and Truth above all. Such is the need to support the organic existence of the Russian people.

- 43) Putin’s ideological statement [in October 2021 at the Valdai Discussion Club] is not extreme, but broadly humanitarian, without significant

83 In October 2021, Putin delivered a speech to the 18th Plenary Session of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia, in which he made reference to Russian philosopher Berdyaev, thereby “appearing to...encourage personal creativity, dialogue and engagement rather than a self-serving ideology and paternalism...” But Berdyaev’s philosophy was one of personal freedom. His 1917 work, *The Philosophy of Inequality*, “voiced a powerful critique of societal myths and mentalities that lead to a crushing totalitarian control over life.” See <https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-philosophy-of-inequality-nicholas-berdyaev/1122025853> and for further details on the Valdai address, <https://asiatimes.com/2021/11/the-optimistic-conservatism-of-putins-valdai-address/> and <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/10/22/putin-rails-against-monstrous-west-in-valdai-speech-a75373>

84 Zholkovsky, Alexander. (1994). *Text Countertext: Rereadings in Russian Literary History*. Stanford University Press. Page 333. “Dostoevsky spoofs the traditional recurrence of the ‘same old dream’ not only by iteration but also by the dream’s very content: The Russian idiom *skazka pro belogo byka/bychka* (‘a tale about the white bull’ or, in Russian, ‘сказка про белого быка/бычка’) means ‘endless repetition of one and the same thing’—always being drawn to tradition, for example.”

85 Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin was Prime Minister of Russia from 1992 to 1998. Interestingly, he was known for his malapropisms and syntactic errors. Many of his sayings became aphorisms and idioms in the Russian language, one example being the expression “We wanted the best, but it turned out like always” [in Russian: “Хотели как лучше, а получилось как всегда.”] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Chernomyrdin

innovations: “The conservative approach is not one of mindless guarding, not a fear of change, and not a game of playing to hold much less retreating into one’s own shell. It is primarily a reliance on a time-tested tradition—(yes, but which one exactly? Imperial? recent Soviet? or that of today’s thieves? -E.V.)—reliance on the fundamental rejection of extremism as a way of action.”⁸⁶

- 44) As stated earlier, Putin’s ideological concept is based on Berdyaev’s “philosophy of inequality.” If this is any indication of an attempt to inject a system of inequality into Russian society, then it is difficult to shake the thought of the people’s lawful, in God’s eyes, opposition to such an abuse of power. And a rebellion in Russia, according to Pushkin, is

“resolute and merciless.”⁸⁷ The urgent need for total justice that Russian society demands can no longer be ignored by the populist regime which allows only cosmetic changes to its ugly, anti-people nature, rather than what is expected—a dismantling of an inherently alien and rotten structure. Although the Kremlin assures that there will be no return to 1937,⁸⁸ TV commentator V. Solovyev time and again has proposed to the leadership that he be appointed the sword of retribution of the security apparatuses—Chief of the Death-To-Spies [organizations].⁸⁹ Everything is not so unambiguous in this “kingdom of distorted mirrors.”

- 45) And if N. Berdyaev appeals to you, then take great care: this exist-

86 Russian President Vladimir Putin’s address to the plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club was reported, in part, online by the Russian business daily newspaper, *Vedomosti* (2021, October 21). In his address, Putin announced the principles of healthy conservatism which is at the heart of Russia’s approaches. [In Russian online: Путин заявил о принципах здорового консерватизма в основе подходов России.] <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2021/10/21/892404-printsipah-zdorovogo-konservatizma>

87 This reference is taken from Chapter 13 of Russian writer A. S. Pushkin’s novella *The Captain’s Daughter*, Chapter 13 [in Russian, Капитанская дочь.] One translation of the original reads, “God forbid we should see a Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless!” [In Russian, “ Не приведи Бог видеть русский бунт, бессмысленный и беспощадный!”] https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dic_wingwords/2402/Русский

88 “On July 31, 1937, one of the most terrible documents in history was signed—the secret operational order of the NKVD No. 00447, which marked the beginning of the events known as ‘Yezhovism.’ Yezhov was head of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) -- the secret police -- under Stalin. See Krechetnikov, Artem. (2017, July 31) “Stalin’s Strike: 80 years ago the Great terror started in the USSR.” *BBC Russian Service, Moscow*. [Original in Russian: Сталинский удар: 80 лет назад в СССР начался Большой террор.] <https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-40756213>

89 Here Dr. Vertlieb uses his own portmanteau for “Chief of the Death-to-Spies [organizations]”—Glav (Chief)+ SMERSH (acronym for Death to Spies)+suffix for a person—in Russian: “Глав+СМЕРШ+евец” or ГлавСМЕРШевец. SMERSH actually refers to the motto of an umbrella organization established for three counterintelligence Red Army agencies formed in about 1942—SMER(T) or DEATH+ShPIONAM “TO SPIES.”

entialist philosopher is a "great sower of confusion" and can lead you astray. More suitable for the development of the Kremlin's new ideology seems to me to be the founder of Russian political science, Professor of Moscow University B. N. Chicherin (even though N. A. Berdyaev declared him an "enemy of democracy"). Chicherin defends the constitutionalist, political-legal ideal. His guiding principle—the *Course in the Science of Government*⁹⁰—was his desire to "reconcile the principles of freedom with the principles of power and law." This was the basic postulate of the Chicherin program of protective liberalism, the main political slogan of which is "liberal measures and strong power." In addition, in a technical way, he more skillfully

combines the concepts of "inequality" with "justice": "Equality in the possession of material goods follows from the requirements of justice just as little as the equality of bodily strength, mind, and beauty follow from one another." Equality of rights (formal) cannot be replaced by equality of possessions (of material goods). Few people in Russian political culture have established the ontological nature of inequality so convincingly unless it is the philosopher and diplomat Konstantin Leontiev for whose conservatism Leo Tolstoy⁹¹ and Fyodor Dostoevsky were only "pink Christians"⁹²—individuals who were not adequately working to counter the tendency of the Russian people to fall away from Orthodoxy. Deep churching, i.e., completely leading

90 "In his *Course in the Science of Government* (1894) [in Russian: Курс государственной науки], Chicherin formulated four asks for the state: to provide security, protect civil rights, uphold the moral order through the rule of law and justice, and to pursue the public good." See (2009) Chicherin and Shipov: two competing visions of local self-government and central representation from the 1890s to the early 1900s. *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies*, 23 (1-2), 39-56.

91 "The Tolstoyan movement is a social movement based on the philosophical and religious views of Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy denied that there was any actual 'movement' but was gladdened by the fact that groups of people were declaring complete agreement with his views.... 'Tolstoyans' identified themselves as Christians, but who did not generally belong to an institutional church. Tolstoy was a harsh critic of the Russian Orthodox Church, leading to his excommunication in 1901." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tolstoyan_movement

92 Orekhanov, Georgy and Pushchayev, Yury. (2012, September 26). Pink Christianity (Part 1): The Lonely Thinker vs. Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. *FOMA Magazine*. [Original in Russian: Розовое христианство (часть 1): Одинокий мыслитель против Толстого и Достоевского.] Konstantin Leontiev called Tolstoy and Dostoevsky "pink Christians" because of the questioning way the writers dealt with Christianity in their writings. Leontiev predicted the falling away of the Russian people from Orthodoxy and believed these authors were not helping to prevent this. The way the authors dealt with Christianity in their works was therefore only "rose-colored" or "cosmetic." Some believe that the term stemmed from the fact that in that time, "rose water" was a very popular facial lotion. <https://foma.ru/rozovoe-xristianstvo-ch1.html>

an Orthodox life, prompted Leontiev to become a monk.

- 46) “President Putin,” I wrote in 2007, “is probably familiar with the liberal-conservative concept of Boris Chicherin, who formulated a political principle that is very suitable for the current government in Russia—liberal measures and strong power.” Characterizing Berdyaev, Chicherin said, “He was a rare statesman in Russia, very different in this way from both the Slavophiles and the left Westerners He accepts the empire, but wants it to be cultural and to absorb liberal legal elements.” These are points consonant with Putin’s.
- 47) And one more pencil stroke in the blueprint that Chicherin draws for devising an ideology: Berdyaev was indeed confused. “Conservatism,” writes philosopher Chicherin, “is not what prevents moving up and forward, but what prevents going back and down, towards chaos.”⁹³ By context, chaos is inherent in the state of affairs that exists before one arrives at conservatism. Putin’s “chaos” is a hyperbole, used in a figurative sense, an assimilation of the subversive (terrorist) tendencies of the masses toward chaos. Berdyaev’s

impulse is of a different mix: Yes, “the pressure of chaotic darkness from below” exists (this is true), but not due to anarchist-protestants, but, rather, as a result of “the inherent primordial-sinful [Original Sin-based], animal-chaotic element found in human societies.” Like some sort of pre-societal phantoms. And the main thing for Berdyaev is this: “Chaotic formless darkness in of itself is not yet evil, but only a boundless source of life.” Putin’s idea of everyday “extremism” does not follow from Berdyaev’s ontological “evil.” Generally, things are not going well with the Russian Federation’s top expert on “evil” although the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences did spend 742,000 rubles on research on hell and evil.⁹⁴

- 48) Evil is not something that is there from the beginning, but, rather, something that arises after the fact. Confucius testifies to this: “Evil has no independent cause in the universe.” Evil could not be created by the benevolent Heavens as an independent element of the world. It stems from the violation of order (which does not mean “public order!”-E.V.), that is, from the violation of good by a failure

93 In his address to the Valdai Discussion Club in October 2021, Putin cited precisely these words of Chicherin’s about conservatism. See McDonough, Tom. (2021, November 5) The optimistic conservatism of Putin’s Valdai address. *Asia Times*. Online at <https://asiatimes.com/2021/11/the-optimistic-conservatism-of-putins-valdai-address/>

94 “In recent months, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences has ordered several studies in the titles of which the words ‘hell’ and ‘evil’ appeared. The latter took 742 thousand rubles.... All this is within the law,’ the institute said.” <https://financialnerd.com/the-ras-institute-spent-742-thousand-rubles-to-study-hell-and-evil/>

to understand the heavenly order. We inject disorder into the world, destroying its original harmony; we create chaos in it, thereby violating and destroying its original order. This is how misfortunes and troubles appear. This is how evil appears. Thus, evil is the result of an upset in the world’s balance of order. Evil is an imbalance in the universe. Berdyaev’s idea is that chaos correlates organically with order. Order is a positive, primary category of the universe (as in Chinese cosmogony), and not something that falls in the range of “mass disorders” (disharmony, rebellion).

49) So it’s precisely the right time to encourage the acceptance of libertarian conservatism as part of a new [Russian] ideology—a right-wing political movement that seeks to combine libertarian and conservative ideas, that is, one that tries to develop the idea of preserving traditions and maintaining a conservative course of development while maintaining the individual freedom of every single person. “Sobornost” allowed a person to see an himself as an individual or, in the words of

A. I. Klibanov,⁹⁵ Christianity taught the internal sovereignty of the individual. Based upon its general shape and essence, Putin’s ideologeme is “liberal conservatism” while the very need of Russia, as a besieged fortress, is something different: it is “the strategic conservatism of Victory.”

50) Conservatism can be a component of various worldview combinatorics. So an “ideology of order and protection”⁹⁶ is questionable. After all, “order,” in the slogan “anarchy is the mother of order,” is not legitimate when referring to “protection.” The same is true for power. And if it is a “whitewashed autocracy”? Conservatism for Russia is a historically natural and mentally sound consolidator of the people and a prerequisite for establishing a new balance of social intentions—a balance between the “icon” (order) and the “axe” (rebellion).

51) Not believing in a voluntary change to the “unchanging” course of the country, the supporters of the core Russian political orientation—the people’s monarchist adherents—rely

95 Aleksandr Ilyich Klibanov (1910-1994) was a Russian historian, religious scholar, and author of numerous scholarly works. For a detailed biography, see <https://www.pravenc.ru/text/1841323.html>

96 Nemensky, Oleg. (2013, June 5). Protection [in Russian: Охранительство]. *Political News Agency*. Nizhny Novgorod “Ideology of order and protection” refers to an ideology calling for the preservation of order and the maintenance of the status quo. In an online article addressing the use of the Russian word “protection,” Nemensky claims that the word “cannot be translated into other languages...[but] most often it is understood as an ideological orientation towards maintaining the *existing state of affairs*, especially with regard to state power.” https://apn--nn-com.translate.google/analytics/okhranitelstvo/?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=op,sc

on a “national military dictatorship” to save the Fatherland. The “putsch scenario” of a change in power is also being written about in the West, for example, in Catherine Belton’s book, *Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Russia, and then Took on the West*.⁹⁷ One thing is clear: without a change in the paradigm of the current course of the Russian Federation—the “nationalization” of the very logic behind Russian thinking and the strengthening of the pro-Russian dominant element—the country will lose not only sovereignty, but also the vital resources for the reproduction of the nation. The degradation and depopulation of the population of the Russian Federation is a demographic catastrophe with geostrategic consequences: With a numerically small population of 145, 975, 300 people, it is difficult to preserve the Motherland from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok.

- 52) The “main foundation” of the guiding ideology should be the assimilation of the axiom: the Russian idea—imperial in essence and “the creator of national self-consciousness, culture, and religious providence—as

the destiny of the nation.” Its categories—Spirituality, Sovereignty, and Sobornost—are triune, modeled on the Holy Trinity and the triad of Good, Truth, and Beauty. And remember both that a liberal is not a boogeyman, and that a conservative is not [a source of] salvation if he does not live in Russia. As Herzen⁹⁸ spoke of the Westernizers and the Slavophiles, they “looked in different directions” but “the heart beat the same.” The exuberance of youth such as theirs grows wiser with age, they live without clashing with one other: “He who was not a liberal in youth has no heart, he who in maturity has not become a conservative has no brain.”

- 53) In terms of any concrete reconciliation of the ideological camps within the Russian world, one biographical fact comes to mind: In the late 1970s, philosopher Pyotr Boldyrev and I were the first in the world abroad to try to reconcile “liberals” and “conservatives” with one other. In the joint article, “Solzhenitsyn and Yanov”—published in Dovlatov’s *New American*⁹⁹—instead of the usual “either-or,” we combined the opposite poles, replacing this

97 Belton, Kathryn. (2020, April 2). *Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 640 pages. ISBN-10: 0374238715, ISBN-13: 978-0374238711.

98 Aleksandr I. Herzen (1812-1870) was a Russian writer and thinker known as the “father of Russian socialism.” Among other things, he fought for the emancipation of the Russian serfs, and after that took place in 1861, he escalated his demands regarding constitutional rights, common ownership of land, and government by the people. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Herzen

99 The article appeared in (1981, March 24) *The New American*, New York, 59, 36. Sergey Dovlatov, unable to publish in the USSR, resorted to underground *samizdat* as a means for circu-

wasteful, fruitless disjunction with a reassuring “and-and.” We asked ourselves the question: Is there any sort of “unity of opposites” discernible in the historical concepts of these opponents or in their interpretations of Russian history? And with all the apparent and undeniable dualism, are there any obvious irreducible elements the two share? It turned out that both “progressives” (liberals) and “intuitionists” holding unchanging values in history (i.e., conservatives—supporters of “substance of the people,” “community,” and “the soul of the people”) ideologically “lapsed” into the Russian “liberal conservatism” or “protective liberalism” of B. Chicherin, who was highly valued by both the liberal, P. Struve,¹⁰⁰ and the conservative, I. Ilyin.¹⁰¹ The credo of conservative (concrete) liberalism can be expressed something like this: not a “liberalism in general terms” but one that includes national-cultural traditions; not a provincial, constrained, national “conservatism” (protection) but one based upon universal cultural values.

Sometimes one can get lost among these various ideological azimuths. For example, in England, liberalism is eight centuries old and began with the “Magna Carta Libertatum.” Therefore, the liberal values of individual freedom are more traditional. Does this mean that adherence to the precise values of liberalism turns out to be the most extreme form of conservatism?

Seeking a Middle-of-the-Road Solution

54) For the rhetorical question we posed then: Isn’t it time for the modern Russian opposition (with its historiography) to pay closer attention to this third, “middle” path—the drifting of those intent on confrontation from a position of confrontation to synthesis, where we would get the most of out of both [liberalism and conservatism]? A healthy balance of conservatism and liberalism serves to correct both of these spiritual tendencies, neutralizing their extreme forms of expression—the descent of conservatism

lating his works. He was expelled from the country and became a prominent figure in the New York émigré community. He served as a co-editor of *The New American*, a liberal Russian-language émigré newspaper. He finally received recognition as a writer when he was printed in *The New Yorker* magazine. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Dovlatov

100 Petr B. Struve (1870-1944) was a Russian political economist, philosopher, historian, and editor. He started out as a Marxist, later became a liberal, and after the Bolshevik Revolution, joined the White movement. From 1920, he lived in exile in Paris, where he was a prominent critic of Russian communism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Struve

101 Synder, Timothy. (2018, March 16). Ivan Ilyin, Putin’s Philosopher of Russian Fascism. *The New York Review*. Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954) provided a metaphysical and moral justification for political totalitarianism, which he expressed in practical outlines for a fascist state. Today, his ideas have been revived and celebrated by Vladimir Putin. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Struve

into “obscurantism,” and of liberalism into “extreme progressivism.” Establishing defining lines among social groups is more complicated than with analogs from natural science. Ideologies, like metals, are subject to transmutation and are good neighbors with their own kind, the metalloids. The classification is elementary with metals: unpaired d-electrons give life to transition metals. But the secrets of social groups are revealed by devilish master keys: neural networks now have been taught to determine the political views of a person. Artificial intelligence can identify supporters of liberalism and adherents of conservative views from photographs. It turns out that liberals more often look directly into the camera lens, expressing surprise. Liberals cannot stand even the smell of conservatives. It was experimentally deduced that conservatives are more squeamish than liberals. The conclusion is far-reaching: perhaps the fact that liberals have little to no distaste for anything, it pushes them to change. It pushes them to hold protests. Or even seek revolutionary changes.

On the other hand, conservatives turn out to be happier than liberals: The more liberal a person is, the more unhappy he is. And vice versa. The phenomenon is explained by the difference in their understanding of justice. What prevents liberals from being happy is the feeling that the difference between the rich and the poor is too great, that public goods are distributed somehow wrongly. Stemming from this, they, as a rule, are unhappy even in their personal lives.¹⁰²

- 55) The new ideological conglomeration of the conservative and liberal heritage —of all that is the best of each—inevitably includes the basic values of “classical” liberalism such as: a) the absolute value of the human individual and the natural (“from birth”) equality of all people; b) the existence of certain inalienable human rights such as the right to life, personal freedom (while not infringing on others’ freedom), and justice; c) the creation of a state based on general consensus in order to preserve and protect the natural rights of man; d) the rule of law

102 Numerous articles address studies made of liberal and conservative “brains”—physical differences related to varied political thinking. For information on artificial intelligence and predicting political orientation, see Yirka, Bob (2021, January 14) AI algorithm over 70% accurate at guessing a person’s political orientation, *Tech Xplore*, <https://techxplore.com/news/2021-01-ai-algorithm-accurate-person-political.html>, and for information on political neuroscience, Denworth, Lydia (2020, October 26). Conservative and Liberal Brains Might Have Some Real Differences, *Scientific American*: “Social scientists who observe behaviors in the political sphere can gain substantial insight into the hazards of errant partisanship. Political neuroscience, however, attempts to deepen these observations by supplying evidence that a belief or bias manifests as a measure of brain volume or activity—demonstrating that an attitude, conviction or misconception is, in fact, genuine.... Partisanship does not just affect our vote; it influences our memory, reasoning and even our perception of truth.” <https://www>.

as an instrument of social control and "freedom within the law" as the right and opportunity, as stated by John Locke, "to live in accordance with a permanent law common to everyone in the society and to not be dependent on the fickle, indefinite, unknown autocratic will of another person"; and, e) the ability of each individual to spiritually progress and seek moral perfection. "Participating in the economic life of society," Adam Smith, the 18th century philosopher, maintains that "every person, in addition to satisfying his own interests, involuntarily contributes to the fulfillment of common interests, because they are nothing more than 'the sum of the interests of individual members of society.'"

- 56) The main features of conservatism are the following: "The preservation of the ancient moral traditions of mankind; respect for the wisdom of ancestors; rejection of radical changes in traditional values and institutions; the conviction that society cannot be built according to speculatively designed schemes; happiness is impossible without

harmonious relations with society"¹⁰³—notions of ancient philosophers and of conservative E. Burke. In modern conservatism, different groupings are united by common concepts, ideas, and ideals. Although conservatism is traditionally identified with the defense of the social status quo, a characteristic feature of the modern conservative renaissance has been the fact that it was the neoconservatives and the "new right" who initiated the changes aimed at restructuring the existing order. Therefore, the churning of turmoil both on the left and on the right is not ruled out. There is more in common between the extremes than between the centrists.

- 57) Apparently, this duality is natural. After all, liberalism initially has a conservative element. In his theory of the social contract, the master of liberalism, John Locke, means that the people do not fully transfer their power to the state; they only delegate it for the protection of the whole society. In other words, by creating the state, people sought to safeguard their civil interests, to

businessinsider.com/psychological-differences-between-conservatives-and-liberals-2018-2

103 Author unknown. (2013, January 25). Liberalism and conservatism—from confrontation to synthesis. [In Russian: Либерализм - от противоборства к синтезу.] *REFSRU*. "The concept of 'conservatism' was first used by the French writer Chateaubriand. The history of conservatism...begins with the Great French Revolution, which challenged the very foundations of the 'old order,' all traditional forces, and all forms of domination by the feudal aristocracy. It was from that time that two classical forms of conservatism originated: the first, which comes from the French thinkers J. de Maistre and L. De Bonand; the second - from the English thinker Edmund Burke." Burke's brand of conservatism "was destined for a long life...Burke's book *Reflections on the Revolution in France* marked the emergence of conservatism as a social current..." https://www-refsru-com.translate.google/referat-16144-2.html?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc

protect their freedom. As N. Andreev states, "It is about freedom of conscience, thought, the protection of one's legal status, the fulfillment of tax obligations sanctioned by the state and codified in legislation, etc. In light of these things, the liberals defend the need for each government to adopt a constitutional act that enshrines the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen." The Slavophiles, who profess inner truth as the primary regulator of social relations, were appalled by the regulated legalism of the "agreement." According to their conviction, the Autocracy and the People are united by their common professed Orthodoxy. As I. Aksakov¹⁰⁴ wrote: "That is the whole essence of the union of the Tsar with the people, that they have one divine moral basis of life, one God, one Judge, one law of the Lord, one truth, one conscience." The activities of both the Earth (the people) and the Tsar are based on Divine Will and Truth. Consequently, according to the Slavophile doctrine, there can be no talk of any contractual principles for the emergence of power. The best form of government for Russia is the Monarchy, which has provided true freedom.

- 58) The ruling nomenklatura is terribly far removed from the people. If it was the extreme "liberals" who

ruined Russia in 1917, why are such people still in power?! In a situation where people and government co-exist as if in parallel realities, and the "servants of the people" serve the ruling comprador oligarchy, often adopting clearly anti-people legislation, most citizens of the Russian Federation are waiting for a real pro-people policy, implemented no matter what the party emblems, if only by "the leader's own down-to-earth" interests and incorruptible principles.

- 59) Anything that threatens Russian identity should not be sanctioned by the authorities unless in a limited one-time use—how Emperor Paul allied with heretic Catholics in opposition to the French Revolution. And then, with perestroika, the principle of catholicity ("sobornost") was, in fact, eliminated, and a synod was not declared as the main authority of the church, but, rather, an administration of the patriarch and bishops. Metropolitan Hilarion, after meeting with Pope Francis, said: "There is a very great prejudice against Catholics among the Orthodox people, and we must in no way risk the unity of our churches and the peace in our churches, therefore we must move forward in our relations with Catholics with all speed possible." Is it a coincidence that when Russia is gathering itself,

¹⁰⁴ Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov was a noted 19th century Slavophile, controversial journalist, newspaper publisher, and proponent of Pan-Slavism. His brother, Konstantin Sergeyevich, was one of the founders and principal theorists of the Slavophile movement. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-Sergeyevich-Aksakov>

Patriarch Kirill warns the “bosses” against tyranny? Or Yeltsin’s irremovable system of “checks and balances” is being triggered? It is also “tradition.” Conservatism is being faithful to the original Plan of God, that is, to the Orthodox religion and to the corresponding ideology of how to organize the earthly life of the state. This is the “blossoming complexity” of attempting to lay out the specifics of a civilization.

- 60) Attempts to conserve the ruling regime in the Russian Federation with state “conservatism”—completely in opposition to the Russian national tradition and to the recognition of the Russian people as a conciliar entity—are fraught with upheavals and a degradation of the country. For an imperial monarchic mindset, state

conservatism is unacceptable, being protective both from the excessive claims of the West and from its own people—legalized by the oligarchic “multinational” constitution and the increase in punitive “extremist” articles in the Criminal Code. Unfortunately, the current church leadership often understands its conservatism as the priestly service to any authority which supposedly does not exist if it is “not from God.” But under the current conditions, a liberal-Maidan-type rebellion could bring rulers to power in Russia who are even more hostile to Russian tradition. The “Ideology of Victory as a National Project”¹⁰⁵ is designed to counter the ideology of “inclusive capitalism” of the new globalist order named after Klaus Schwab.¹⁰⁶ God’s Providence itself obliges

105 Averyanov, Vitaly. (2021, October 28). The Ideology of Victory as a National Project. [In Russian: Идеология победы как национальный проект.] *The S. P. Kurdyumov ANO Center for Interdisciplinary Research*. According to Averyanov, “A civilization awakening from a traumatic hibernation is in dire need of an integrating ideology. In 2000-2020 the authorities made certain efforts to restore traditional patriotism around the image of the victorious country.... One can even say that modern Russia already has an ideology — the ideology of Victory.... In our Victory, all imperial tendencies really merged...feuds fell silent...pre-war contradictions were blunted. It was a grandiose, mystical, religious in spirit Victory.... [Now there is an] urgent need to focus on what and over whom we have to win a new Victory, the successor Victory.... [Also needed is] the revival of historical optimism, the mythology of Great Development under the slogan “Give back the dream to the people.” <https://spkurdyumov.ru/future/ideologiya-pobedy-kak-nacionalnyj-proekt/>

106 Schwab, Klaus. (2019, December 2). What Kind of Capitalism Do We Want? *Project Syndicate*. World Economic Forum founder and Executive Chairman, Klaus Schwab is the originator of “stakeholder capitalism,” a model he first proposed a half-century ago.... [It] positions private corporations as trustees of society, and is clearly the best response to today’s social and environmental challenges.... [To] ensure that stakeholder capitalism remains the new dominant model...the World Economic Forum is releasing a new “[Davos Manifesto](#),” which states that companies should pay their fair share of taxes, show zero tolerance for corruption, uphold human rights throughout their global supply chains, and advocate for a competitive level playing field....” ‘Stakeholder capitalism’ appears to be synonymous with ‘inclusive capitalism’ which “is fundamentally about creating long-term value for all stakeholders [providing] equality of opportunity...equitable outcomes...fairness across generations...and fairness in society.” <https://>

Russia to play the role of that same Restrainer, about whom the apostle Paul spoke (2 Thessalonians 2:7),¹⁰⁷ in this battle against world evil.

- 61) Today, the Russian government positions itself as an adherent of conservative values but acts more often as a pragmatist and a “distilled liberal.” Writer Alexander Prokhanov,¹⁰⁸ when asked what is wrong with liberalism, answers, “Russia’s experience of interacting with liberals ends completely tragically for the country—Russia disintegrates. Liberals can be colorful and attractive but their presence in power leads to the fact that they destroy the state without offering any other foundations. Russia is collapsing and in order to restore it, we must bring back

the imperial form of government at a huge cost—at the cost of losing historical time and losing people. Left and right domestic conservatives are “great-state-power advocates” for whom a strong state is one of the key values. Russia is currently still struggling with the legacy of the “third turmoil” of 1991.¹⁰⁹ These are lost territories, and economic problems, and “tacit support for the Washington Consensus.”¹¹⁰

- 62) Juliette Faure, a French researcher of contemporary Russian conservatism, writes about this in her dissertation about dynamic conservatism, which is being created in an ideology that is based on the synthesis of tradition and modernity.¹¹¹ The author quotes the main ideologist

www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stakeholder-capitalism-new-metrics-by-kl aus-schwab-2019-11 and <https://www.inclusivecapitalism.com/what-is-inclusive-capitalism/>

- 107 The verse reads: “For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only He who now restrains will do so until He is taken out of the way.” New King James Version.
- 108 “Alexander Prokhanov is a prize-winning Russian novelist and, as editor of the weekly newspaper *Zavtra* [Завтра], a leading figure in Russian imperial patriotism” according to a description of Edmund Griffiths’ book *Aleksandr Prokhanov and Post-Soviet Esotericism* found at <http://cup.columbia.edu/book/aleksandr-prokhanov-and-post-soviet-esotericism/9783838209630>
- 109 Legacy of the Third Turmoil of 1991 apparently refers to the aftermath of the failed 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt by communist hard-liners to take control of the country from Mikhail Gorbachev, who was Soviet President and General Secretary of the Party. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Soviet_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt
- 110 The Washington Consensus is a set of ten economic policy prescriptions considered to constitute the “standard” reform package promoted for crisis-racked developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus
- 111 Faure, Juliette. (2019, January 28). The idea of tradition at the heart of the politics of the contemporary Russian regime: a “dynamic conservatism”? [In French: L’idée de tradition au cœur de la politique du régime russe contemporain: un “conservatisme dynamique?”] *Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS)*. This work constituted her Masters thesis. Faure is a PhD candidate in political science at Sciences Po Paris and Visiting Fellow at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. <https://spire.sciencespo.fr/notice/2441/51gf1nlacp8hhaepbqffd19i09>

of “dynamic conservatism,” Vitaly Averyanov,¹¹² who claims that the task is “to create a centaur from Orthodoxy and innovation, from high spirituality and high technology. This centaur will represent the face of Russia in the 21st century.” Apparently in no way can it be done without the “centaur”—a frightening symbiosis of wisdom and courage in the person of the ancient Slavic deity Kitovras.¹¹³ For, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, one cannot win the Cold War without having an alternative ideology: “To be a military adversary of the United States on a global scale, Russia will have to fulfill some mission, implement a global strategy and ... acquire an ideological basis.” While this seems “unlikely” to Brzezinski, Russia is trying different options to “save itself and the world.” He is imagining a future system—a meritocracy (leadership by the best)

under the auspices of a specially created official Strategic Council of the Russian Federation, equipped with powerful “ideological weapons.” That, however, should not hamper, as the philosopher I. Ilyin says, “the soul of the Russian people which always seeks its roots in God and in his earthly phenomena—in truth, righteousness and beauty.”

63) It is clear, Greeks of present day, neo-Byzantinism “is all ours.” But from the standpoint of a temporary “reverse perspective”¹¹⁴ (D. S. Likhachev’s term),¹¹⁵ those “front eyelids” are the most important thing for us: there is the root cause of today’s “lack of unity” within the Russian Federation, both in the mental and territorial sense. Without a strict, rigorous assessment of what happened to the Motherland—from the Nikon schism to the execution of the parliament—it

112 Faure, Juliette. (2021, April 3). ‘Dynamic conservatism’: A Russian version of reactionary modernism. *Ideology, Theory, Practice*. Faure notes that “...after the fall of the USSR, Prokhanov’s modernism became commonplace among the members of the younger generation of conservative thinkers...[who] framed their views in the post-Soviet context, and regarded technological modernity as instrumental for the recovery of Russia’s status as a great power.” <https://www.ideology-theory-practice.org/blog/dynamic-conservatism-a-russian-version-of-reactionary-modernism>

113 In this retelling of Efrosin’s 15th century philosophical tale, the author writes, “The biblical king Solomon, who was building the Holy of Holies (the famous Jerusalem temple), needed the advice of Kitovras.” Ultimately, “thanks to the advice of Kitovras, the construction of the temple is successfully completed.” Versions of the entire legend are available at <https://en.inbel.org/3408-the-legend-of-how-kitovras-was-taken-by-solomon.html> and <https://sourcebook.stanford.edu/text/efrosins-tale-solomon-and-kitrovas>

114 Using reverse perspective in iconography means transferring the point of presence from the viewer to the icon itself...the icon is looking at us. Chechko, Daria. (2020, March 5). The Reverse Perspective in Iconography. Article posted online by *The Catalogue of Good Deeds*. <https://blog.obitel-minsk.com>

115 Dmitry Likhachev (1906-1999) was a Russian medievalist, linguist, and GULAG survivor. President Boris Yeltsin often sought his advice on cultural and historical issues.

is impossible to develop a national ideology for the Russian people.

***Putin's War against Ukraine:
Between a Rock and a Hard
Place—Strategic Conservatism?***

64) With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “Soviet” ideology, as a remnant, was done away with. However, given the conditions of the now exacerbated civilizational clash between historical antagonists, the Russian establishment needed a patriotic ideology to

consolidate the nation. Thus, the ideology of “strategic conservatism” was born.¹¹⁶ It was put to the test by the “second winter war”¹¹⁷—being fought for the “denazification” of Ukraine (a term referring to the eradication of Nazi ideology—Entnazifizierung). The question arises: If the purpose of this special operation *is the destruction of the [modern-day version of the] “Nazi regime” of Bandera*,¹¹⁸ then why is the Kremlin conducting separate negotiations with the “Ukies”¹¹⁹ without first completing its assigned task?!

116 Putin's strategic conservatism actively seeks “to influence religious and traditional views to further its own agenda...and reflects the idea that political and cultural preferences can be used as tools of influence.” Putin uses the Russian Orthodox Church, Orthodox oligarchs, and intellectuals who support either him or the ROC's efforts to achieve his political aims... In addition, Russia positions itself as a defender of the traditional order and conservative values—the political and cultural embodiment of the Third Rome. The Kremlin amplifies this message through U.S. and European conservative networks.” See Conley, Heather A. & Ruy, Donatienne. (2022). *The Kremlin Playbook 3. Center for Strategic and International Studies*. ISBN: 978-1-5381-7045-8 (pb); 978-1-5381-7046-5 (eBook). An article summarizing the work can be found online at <https://www.csis.org/features/kremlin-playbook-3>

117 Dr. Vertlieb is coining his own term for the current Russian military actions against Ukraine. The “Winter War” is the term the Finns use to refer to the Russo-Finnish War in 1939-40. The underlying cause for the war was Soviet concern about Nazi Germany's expansionism.... Finland itself was not a threat to the Soviet Union, but its territory, located strategically near Leningrad, could be used as a base by the Germans. The Soviets initiated negotiations with Finland that ran intermittently from the spring of 1938 to the summer of 1939, but nothing was achieved. Finnish assurances that the country would never allow German violations of its neutrality were not accepted by the Soviets, who asked for more concrete guarantees. In particular, the Soviets sought a base on the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland... [but the] Finnish government...felt that accepting these terms would only lead to further, increasingly unreasonable, demands. <http://countrystudies.us/finland/19.htm>

118 Putin claims that the current operation against Ukraine and its leadership is a repeat of the Soviet military actions against Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), i.e., an elimination of “pro-fascist” forces. Bandera was the leader of the revolutionary faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which, along with its partisan army – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—strove to eliminate all ethnically non-Ukrainian elements from Ukrainian soil (including Jews, Russians, Poles, Gypsies, etc.). For a certain period of time, Bandera collaborated with Germans in the hope of achieving this goal. See (2015, January 29) *The Success of Russia's Propaganda: Ukraine's “Banderovtsy.” Cambridge Globalist*. <http://cambridgeglobalist.org/?p=573>

119 Although the term may refer to ancient tribes called the “Ukry” [Russian “Укры”] who were the forerunners of the modern-day Ukrainian people, another use of the term is to refer to

Is Putin retreating, having run up against unexpected (an intelligence miscalculation) strong enemy resistance? Or is it a tactic to achieve victory “by other means” (to blunt the vigilance of the enemy by exchanging the stick for the carrot)? After all, the initial application of the word denazification is widely contextual: it implies not only the cleansing of the *whole* of Ukraine, *but also wider* (Poland? Transdnestria?¹²⁰ The Baltic States?).

65) What made Putin enter into a Khasavyurt 2?¹²¹ Is it only the inter-

ests of the oligarch Abramovich¹²² and others like him looming behind the draft of a separate agreement? It is dangerous for the Kremlin to lose its patriotic facade in the eyes of the people who are expecting the “capture of Kiev” (so that the sacrifices will not have been in vain). The ruling elite is rushing between Scylla and Charybdis—between two bad options for the outcome of the operation. The Kremlin now finds itself in the position of Zugzwang—as in chess, being forced to make a move even though any move at all will lead to a deterioration of its position.

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Ukrainians in a derisive manner. The latter usage is what is intended here. It is used to reflect the attitude of the Russian ruling elite toward the people of Ukraine.

120 Transnistria, officially the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), is an unrecognized breakaway state internationally recognized as part of Moldova.

121 Between 1994 and 2000, Russia waged two wars in Chechnya. The Khasavyurt Accord was an agreement signed in August 1996, that marked the end of the First Chechen War, but it failed to preclude a second war. “Khasavyurt 2,” then, refers to the on-going peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.

122 Russian billionaire oligarch Roman Abramovich accepted a Ukrainian request to have him assist in peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. Abramovich was sanctioned by the EU and UK...over his alleged links to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, which he denies. But [Ukrainian President] Zelensky has reportedly asked the U.S. to hold off from sanctioning Mr. Abramovich, arguing he could play a role in negotiating a peace deal with Moscow. See Roman Abramovich suffered ‘suspected poisoning’ at talks, an 11 March 2022. BBC article online found at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60904676>

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Идеология «стратегического консерватизма» в имперской перспективе России

«Несчастлива страна, в которой всякий консерватизм сделался постылым и насилующим... То в стране готовится революция (философ Н.Бердяев).

«Консерватизм без агрессивной имперской идеи превращается в проповедь мещанского конформизма, исходящего из логики – лишь бы не стало хуже» (историк А.Минаков).

«Дмитрий Медведев не меньший – в хорошем смысле слова – русский националист, чем я» (В.Путин).

- 1) Христианские религиозные конфессии - православие, католицизм и протестантизм вышли из единой духовной основы: прарелигии. В 1054 произошел окончательный раскол церквей, восточной и западной: на восточно-православную и западно-католическую. Этот великий раскол стал главной причиной многих междоусобиц и войн.
- 2) В 1653 Русь присоединила себе Левобережную Украину, на территории которой действовал греческий обряд, распространенный также на Балканах и Ближнем Востоке. Русский обряд отличался от греческого. Например, иначе писалось имя Христа — Иисус, а не Иисус, крестились двумя пальцами, а не тремя. Унификация русского и греческого обрядов объединила бы всех славян — восточных и балканских — и положила бы начало Великой Греко-Российской империи.
- 3) Патриарх Никон и осуществлял церковную реформу от имени царя Алексея Михайловича. Однако внесение изменений в богослужебные книги и некоторые обряды в целях их унификации с современными греческими вызвало церковный раскол на «аввакумовцев» -старообрядцев и «никонян». Отголоски той духовной междоусобицы отчасти наблюдаются в конфронтации идеологий нынешних российских консерваторов и либералов. Современные староверы - носители традиционной русской народной религиозности vs. либералы-западники.

церковной иерархии нарушали органичную связь Бога и Церкви. Ведь до тех новаций истинно верным считалось что только «двуперстие» (старообрядческое крестное знамение) отображает «истинную догматику христианского Символа Веры - распятие и воскресение Христово, а также два естества во Христе - человеческое и Божественное». В трёхперстном (новообрядческо-никоновском) же крестном знамении, в аспекте догматики содержания получалось искажение подлинного смысла: будто на Кресте была распята Троица! Церковной клятвой и постановлениями Стоглавого собора 1551-го закреплялась сохранность двуперстия: «Аще ли кто двумя персты не благословляет якоже и Христос, или не воображает крестного знамения, да будет проклят».

- 4) Этот «инновационный постмодерн» духовной трансформации менял само понятие греха. Деориентированная паства, выбитая из традиционной колеи вероисповедания, теряла этическую уверенность в распознавании «правого» и «грешника». На Страшном Суде «поставит Господь праведных одесную Себя (по правую руку), а грешников — ошуюю (по левую руку). Стояние грешников по левую руку означает и положение руки при совершении крестного знамения на левое плечо». Возникал у при-

хожан храма Господня подспудный страх не угодить бы из-за возникшей неразберихи к «еретикам безблагодатным». Патриарха Никона, заявлявшего о себе «Я по телу русский, а по душе грек», нарекли антихристом.

- 5) К единству расколотое православие возвращалось долго. По фольклорно-этническим повериям и традициям: сперва сращивали разъятые части, потом одухотворяли живой водой и уж затем – возвращали душу. На поместных соборах 1918 и 1971 Русская церковь признала равноспасительность старых обрядов. Единоверческая церковь вернула старообрядцев во Вселенскую Церковь. «Единоверие» как одна вера - Вселенской Православной Церкви. Митрополит Антоний (Храповицкий) восстановил истину о патриархе Никоне. С отстоянием тезиса «Византия – праматерь России» (чему помог убедительный фильм митрополита Тихона «Гибель империи. Византийский урок»), христианский космополитизм Никона был реабилитирован как «апостольский неовизантизм». Патриарх Никон, оказывается, и отстаивал тогда ныне востребованную в России идею «симфонии властей» («двуглавие» - духовной и светской) во главе с православным царём-самодержцем, помазанником Божьим.
- 6) Объединению православных ветвей духовенства способство-

вало противостояние обеих конфессий католичеству. Онтологично противоборство этих антиподов. Как утверждает философ-богослов В.В. Зеньковский, католичество, довольствуясь лишь внешней атрибутикой благочестия, не приняло учение Христа о внутреннем обращении человека к правде и любви. Тем самым отвергло Благовестие Христа о свободе (тогда как православие «во истину свободно во Христе»), а следовательно в глазах ортодоксального подлинноверия католичество «утратило истинно христианское начало».

- 7) Зато явилась идея теократии (Бог плюс управление), которая будучи приложенной к социуму - породила соблазн подчинить человечество единой власти (глобализм «мирового правительства»). Все беды отсюда. Как полагает В.Зеньковский, христианство, реформированное католицизмом, по духу «социалистично» - в смысле насильственного приведения людей к социальному «раю» материального благополучия. А от невольных последствий католической реформации христианства - «католического социализма» - рукой подать до революционного социализма с человеческим лицом: «тот хаос свободы, хаос аморализма, в котором пребывает современное человечество, создан тем, что католичество отвергло Христово учение о свободе». Мо-

дернизация внутри церковной жизни католицизма явилась катализатором революционно-позитивистских социальных потрясений. В «Легенде о Великом Инквизиторе» романа «Братья Карамазовы» Ф.М.Достоевского обыгрывается католическое утверждение, что человечество неспособно к христианской свободе. Потерявший веру в Христа инквизитор хочет разрешить социальную проблематику без Христа, но с помощью отошедшей от заветов «больной» католической церковной организации. Смысл этой аллюзии доказать примат необходимости «вселить в души идеал красоты» над призывами социалистов: «Накорми, тогда и спрашивай добродетели!».

- 8) Католичество, как полагает славянофил А.Хомяков, изменяет началу свободы во имя единства, а протестантство - наоборот. В этом концепте, только православие осталось верным духу первохристианства, являясь гармоничным сочетанием единства и свободы в принципе христианской любви. Католичество прониклось рационализмом, отвергнув соборное начало; протестантство лишь развивает католический рационализм, ведущий от единства к свободе. Запад, констатирует культуролог Н.А.Нарочницкая, - это свобода «от чего» (отсутствие ограничений), а Россия - свобода «для чего» (зачем нужна свобода).

Православие - это свобода служения христианской добродетели «во имя Отца и Сына Святаго Духа».

- 9) Если так, в православии сохраняется вся правда свободы, данной человеку, но преодолевается её хаос. Православию не нужно «уединение», как «эготичное развитие личностного начала». Русско-православный путь цельный: он предполагает, что социальные противоречия разрешаются не через насильственное навязывание человечеству счастья (потребительство, гедонизм, успешность, эгалитарный прогрессивизм), а посредством примирения всех и всего в лоне Церкви. Соборное православное сознание воцерковляет жизнь во Христе. Это и есть тот положительный идеал, который воодушевлял мыслителя Достоевского и который им понимался не как внешнее подчинение Церкви всей жизни (так представляет католичество), но как свободное и внутреннее усвоение жизнью христианских начал во всех её формах бытия. Русская всечеловечность способствует осуществлению Христовых заветов на земле. Через покаяние вернулся к Бого-этическому преображённому себе. Чем глубже пал человек - тем значительнее подвиг его нравственного воскрешения. Страдание - во искупление содеянного греха-зла. Если оно воспринято искренне и глубоко,

свободно явлено и по-настоящему выстрадано - моральное исцеление возможно. Таковы духовные скрижали русского национального миропонимания.

- 10) Русская традиционно-религиозная модель мировосприятия базировалась на абсолютизированном противостоянии полюсов добра и зла. Русское сознание крайностно - «всё или ничего». Оно не любит середины (там серая чертовщина), бескомпромиссно по своей сути. Компромисс рассматривается как беспринципность, неумение проявить волю, настоять на своём. Нет прагматике «золотой середины»-целесообразности. Отрыв свободы от Креста - «грешный рай» - нравственный коллапс для русского сознания, незамутнённого ревизионизмом адаптации. Первозданная чистота православия обречена на «стязания с латиною». Ибо «верующий разум» - истинно Боговерный и вольный во Кресте. Православие сознаёт себя подлинным, неререформируемым христианством, тогда как реформация католицизма невольно способствовала революционизации сознания европейцев. Миссия православия - охранять дух в нравственной первозданной чистоте, а мировой порядок - в Божественной гармонии с правдой и справедливостью.

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- 11) Для русского соборного сознания неприемлемы не только западные фундаментально-мировоззренческие новации, но и «антихристовы» реформы императора Петра Великого: за их беспощадность его нарекли «первым большевиком». Несмотря на всю технологическую пользу Отечеству, он нанёс народу русскому непоправимый вред: отменил патриаршество, подчинил Церковь государству и «приостановил» русскую святость. Прорубив окно в Европу, он надломил русскую консервативную традицию, замутил идентичность, изменил национальный код. Казус с «бородой» обкромсал консервативную «длинноволосатую» нормативность - обернулся разрушением традиционной российской иерархии ценностей. Пусть и усилил имперскую державность заимствованной у Европы атрибутикой. «Он хотел, как подметил философ Жан-Жак Руссо, - сначала создать немцев, англичан, когда надо было начать с того, чтобы создавать русских. Он помешал своим подданным стать когда-нибудь тем, чем они могли бы стать». Император Пётр I решил преобразовать Россию в Голландию (и флаг нынешний в РФ – такой же чуждой масти триколор) ценой превращения государства «в игрушку нескончаемых перемен», ведущих к революции. С позиции консервативного видения, он подорвал «дух народный», то есть самые основы самодержавия, нравственное могущество государства. В связи с чем историк Н.М.Карамзин в Записке «О древней и новой России» констатирует: «Мы с приобретением добродетелей человеческих утратили гражданские. ...Мы стали гражданами мира, но перестали быть, в некоторых случаях, гражданами России. Виною Пётр».
- 12) Карамзин вменяет в вину Петру многое, а главное - создание европеизированного правящего слоя, который, по сути дела, перестал быть русским. Он обвиняет его в этом гигантском болезненном социокультурном расколе, разрыве между верхами и низами. «Вменение Петру создание социокультурной пропасти между верхами и низами, чреватой революцией. И это вменение, пожалуй, одна из главных скреп русской консервативной идеологии до 1917 года. Да и после» - констатирует историк Аркадий Минаков, добавляя: Пётр «верхний слой денационализировал. Сделал его космополитическим. А значит - малопригодным для решения тех проблем, которые стоят перед русскими и Россией».
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- 13) Как Россия возвращалась к себе – своему корневому архаическому вероисповеданию? Древнерусский основательный «крепкодушный» панэтизм, рас-

смаатривавший бытие как онтологизацию морального воззрения на мир, всё же уступил место «инновационному» пути развития. В последекабристской России началась «фаза надлома» (теория этногенеза Льва Гумилёва) русской целостности. При Пушкине «пришёл конец той “органической” России, памятник которой воздвиг в “Войне и мире” Толстой. Затем русский дух оказался загнанным в подполье или изгнанным на чужбину» — пишет академик РАН А.Панченко в предисловии к моей книге «Русское-от Загоскина до Шукшина» (Санкт-Петербург, 1992). Нравственность есть правда — лейтмотив возрожденческой «русопядтой» прозы жизни — «деревенщинков». Голос князя Щербатова из XVIII века «О повреждении нравов в России» звучит серьёзным предупреждением современников о пагубности чуждого нации реформирования. Он справедливо полагал, что нравы допетровской Руси были здоровее и правильнее для «сохранения народа», и что лучше было бы вообще обойтись без реформ. Если бы воцерковленный духовный костяк народа и имперской державности не были крепки, то Россию не пришлось бы ломать через колено дважды за один XX век: сперва — большевиками-ленинцами, потом — антибольшевиками-ельциными. Ныне Россия нацелена на полное восстановление своей целостности и импер-

ской самоидентификации.

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- 14) Перманентный конфликт цивилизаций вступил в предвоенную конфронтацию. Россия, как определяет её нынешний судьбоносный момент английский историк А.Тойнби, сопротивляется имплантированию чужого «цивилизационного клина». И без закона Ньютона понятно, что сила противодействия русских теоретически должна быть не слабее силы воздействия на них. Однако тот факт, что страны Восточной Европы почти беспрепятственно со стороны РФ кооптированы в Североатлантический альянс, говорит о пассивизме русской внешней политики, об отсутствии стратегического паритета между антагонистами. Геополитическое пространство России стремительно сужается, как бальзаковская «шагреновая кожа». Запад вплотную приблизился к границам Российской Федерации. «Красная линия» Кремля сигнализировала об опасности.
- 15) Как справедливо полагает политолог С.Хантингтон, «линии разлома между цивилизациями — это есть линии будущих фронтов». Не потому ли в 1945-м американский генерал Джордж Паттон гнал без передышки своё воинство встречно с русскими — чтобы помешать маршалу Георгию Жукову занять тогда всю Европу.

Если тогда «линия межцивилизационного разлома» пролегла близ германского города Торгау на реке Эльба; то сейчас – считанные минуты ракетно-подлётного времени хоть от Румынии, хоть от Польши. А ежели Украина войдёт в НАТО – Запад приблизится к РФ до 5-7 «ракетных» минут подлёта до Москвы! Во избежание худшего сценария, Кремль 17 декабря 2021 потребовал письменной гарантии прекращения военного осваивания Украины и отведения всей военной инфраструктуры НАТО на позиции 1997-го. Иными словами: предложено капитулировать в ещё неначатой войне. В древнем трактате «Искусство войны» китайского полководца Сунь-Цзы сказано: «Сражения и захваты не могут считаться высшим мастерством военных действий, таким мастерством является сдача армии противника без боя».

- 16) Вряд ли коллективный Запад согласится на капитуляцию. Ведь «Россия очень сильно уступает НАТО как по людским и по промышленным ресурсам, так и по общей мощи вооружений...» - считает военный эксперт Б.Ю.лин. Разве что уравнивает наступательные силы сторон, так это наличие и у РФ гиперзвукового оружия и мощного ядерного арсенала. РФ – не СССР, угрожавший в случае форс-мажорных обстоятельств задействовать план академика А.Д.Сахарова:

создать между Канадой и Мексикой «пролив имени Сталина». РФ – бизнеса ради заправляет танки «незалежной» российским горючим. И только когда всё «смайданилось» в гордиев узел, РФ «была вынуждена что-то делать» (слова В.Путина). Если бы не запахло жареным интересам правящего в РФ олигархата, вряд ли Кремль прибег бы к дерзкой риторике войны – предупреждению об «адекватных военно-технических мерах» в случае форс-мажорных обстоятельств.

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- 17) России перед смертельным вызовом самому её суверенному существованию востребовалась официальная идеология сдерживания и реванша. «Мы хотим, чтобы в России была официальная, иже не преидеши, идеология, базирующаяся на учении Русской православной церкви. Мы хотим, чтобы эта идеология была единственным или хотя бы главным основанием для внешней политики Государства Российского» - волеизъявление патриотического Царьграда. Аналитики Запада придумали и название этой идеологеме - «стратегический консерватизм».
- 18) Кремль только заигрывает с русским национализмом, но боится его (как и либеральный Запад) осуществления в полной мере. Русскому же народу потребно, чтоб Россия снялась с «нейтраль-

ного» дрейфа и двинулась от «общечеловеческой» демагогии к русским религиозно-корневым смыслам своего имперского существования. Поэтому актуализировалась выверка национальной идентичности России – фундамента государства. Срочно реконструируется великодержавность России, основанная на её исторических традициях: идеях особого пути, самобытности, суверенности, русской цивилизационной особенности (как сказал поэт: «у ней особенная стать: в Россию только можно верить»). Упорядочивается внутренний и международный ландшафт в соответствии с православно-советскими ценностями.

19) Благодаря выдвигению собственного бренда «стратегический консерватизм» Кремль, по оценке экспертов вашингтонского Центра стратегических и международных исследований Х.Конли и Д.Руя в статье «The Kremlin Playbook 3» («Кремлёвские планы») стремится достичь следующих целей:

- Снизить прозападные настроения в целевых странах;
- Усилить поддержку политических действий России (внутри страны и за рубежом) и узаконить нарративы Кремля;
- Подорвать поддержку членства в ЕС среди государств-членов

и уменьшить поддержку членства в ЕС и НАТО в странах-кандидатах;

- Сохранить страны постсоветского пространства в сфере влияния России;
- Подорвать внутреннюю сплочённость, суверенитет и, возможно, территориальную целостность таким образом, чтобы это поддерживало интересы Кремля (например, Босния);
- Сместить или ослабить руководство Вселенского Патриархата (который рассматривается как препятствующий объединению православного мира под руководством России); и
- Отменить санкции (сопутствующая и долгосрочная выгода) и подтолкнуть западные правительства к учёту политических интересов России.

20) Так, по оценке западных аналитиков, выглядят «стрелки на карте наступления» новой российской идеологии «стратегический консерватизм» (Strategic Conservatism). Время покажет: «сосредотачивается» ли Россия для своего назревшего национального возрождения под своими древними путеводными Христовыми хоругвями как «символе победы над смертью и

диаволом», а не использует все ради сиюминутной актуальности (не дать Украине вступить в НАТО и спрогнозировать успешно для нынешнего престолонаследия результат президентских выборов-2024)?

- 21) Для России первостепенная задача восстановить свой исконный мировоззренчески геополитический «код», представляющий собой совокупность ключевых представлений россиян о своём месте в истории и мире, внешнеполитической стратегии и национальных приоритетах. Россияне пробуют как китайцы в политике: по всем договорам неизменно требуют «дуйдэн» — паритета взаимоотношений, мер и шагов. В соответствии с духовным концептом «инь и ян» («хаос и порядок»): упорядочивание сущностей — прекращение действия хаоса. В этой связи можно рассматривать требование к НАТО вернуться к состоянию до 1997-го — началу самодвижения альянса к расширению. И недопускать Западом военного освоения Украины — блюсти «красные линии» РФ. А для этого нужен России паритет сил с Западом, достижимый ассиметричным мегаоружием, способным в смысле ответных контругроз уничтожить США и Европу. И сопровождающая консервативно ценностная идеология Русской победы.

* * *

- 22) Подлинные консервативные ценности — как маховик локомотива — необходимы любой общественной системе, чтоб ультра-либеральный «майданизм» не разнёс убийственно саму государственную машину. Идёт дикое разжигание этнического национализма. Шовинистически раздувается ненависть к другому народу просто за то, что он есть (трамповцы, россияне). Запахло в США госпереворотом, даже Второй Гражданской войной. Идёт трансформация к закреплению однопартийной системы (со всеми средневеково-«совковыми» вытекающими: «кто не с нами — тот против нас») — тенденция к лево-фашизирующему социализму. Политические лагеря — всё те же: левые (*sinistram*), значит греховные, плохие, и правые (*iustum*) — верные, правильные. Правые, будучи более консервативными, опирались на традиционную американскую этику: индивидуализм, самодостаточность, трудолюбие, независимость от государства, законопослушание, и равноправие перед законом. Левые с их марксистскими взглядами тяготели к социальным ценностям: коллективизм, стадность, подчинение начальству, примат государства над личностью, и экономическое равенство. Эти два подхода реализовались в двух партиях: республиканской и демократической. Пока Антифа и BLM под лозунгом «Долой полицию» без-

баррикадный плюрализм социальных ориентаций.

23) Язык политкорректности «новоязил» по Дж. Оруэллу: грабёж стал «перераспределением богатства», чёрный криминал стал «жертвой расизма», талант стал «белой привилегией», «белый» стал означать «расист». «Нас, - как констатирует J.Fraden, - ждёт Вторая Гражданская война. Только она будет способна спасти страну. Это будет не только необходимо, но и законно. Напомню, что по этому поводу отцы-основатели США написали 244 года назад в Декларации Независимости: «Когда длинный ряд злоупотреблений и насилий, неизменно подчинённых одной и той же цели, свидетельствует о коварном замысле вынудить народ смириться с неограниченным деспотизмом, свержение такого правительства и создание новых гарантий безопасности на будущее становится правом и обязанностью народа». Консервативной реставрации «старых времён» жаждет и русское национальное сознание, дважды поломанное: в 1917 и 1991.

24) Всё возвращается на круги своя. Как утверждал евразиец Пётр Савицкий, «кто бы ни победил в Гражданской войне – “белые” или “красные”, - всё равно Россия будет противостоять Западу, все равно она будет великой державой, все равно она создаст

Великую Империю». Если так, то для созидания Евразийской России подходит неовизантийская модель государственности - основанная на сочетании религиозных ценностей Православия с началами Империи во главе с Самодержцем (как вариант – функцией его: Вождь, Генсек).

25) На Византизме «симфонии властей», где Церковь и монархия/«вождь народа» тесно сотрудничают в едином социальном литургическом делании - всеобщем спасении базируется идея «Пятой Империи» Александра Проханова. Чтоб воссияло Монамахово «государство правды» - торжество справедливости, спасения, добра. Истинный консерватизм может быть только верным хранением Божественной Истины, а не конъюнктурных задач правящих «элит». Государство и Церковь едины только если они выполняют общекорневую национальную миссию: вместе с народом осуществляют преобразование себя и мира. Митрополит Илларион предсказывает русским великое духовное будущее, применяя к ним евангельскую истину «последние станут первыми».

26) Сквернословят по поводу сурового облика русского имперского консерватизма, уподобляя его «сатанизму сталинизма» и классифицируя «евразийские» проекты Путина и Дугина как

«правоэкстремистский интел- лектуализ в неоавторитарной России». «Гиперконсерватизм» - вообще пугало для либералов. «В конечном счёте,- как полагает политолог А.Малашенко,- этот гипер ведёт к распаду государства – возможно, под напором возмущённой улицы, а возможно, и под ударами экстремизма». Историк А.Минаков же полагает, что консерватизм в России всегда коррелирует с сильной, централизованной, мощной иерархической властью. Ибо в русских условиях только такая власть может обеспечить необходимую мобилизацию как материальных средств, так и людских ресурсов для ведения многочисленных войн. Выжить можно только при наличии мощнейшей централизованной власти, воспринимаемой народом как благо и отождествляемой с тем, что сейчас называется цивилизационным кодом. Основополагающие смыслы духовной корневой системы жизнеобеспечения России – это неразрывно связанная разновидность триады Духовность, Державность и Соборность – содержание “Русской идеи.”

27) Церковный раскол XVII века нарушил целостность сей Триады. Возник острый конфликт между светской и духовной властями, закончившийся утверждением первенства власти царя над властью патриарха. Старообрядности (двуперстия) неизменил

протопоп Аввакум. Его рьяную приверженность традиции nasledуют охранители/ почвенники/консерваторы – сторонники нереформируемого Православия.

28) Путинское понимание консерватизма - не адмирала А.С. Шишкова, одним из первых заговорившего о том, что вестернизированный верхний слой России превратился в некий особый народ, живущий в пределах большого народа, который сохранил подлинные русские ценности. При сохранении пропасти в РФ между «золотояхтовиками» и «подзаборным» людом не исключён смертный бой «двух Рос- сий»: между исходными «проекциями» либералов/западников и консерваторов/хранителей «имперских амбиций». Это предчувствие сшибки я выразил в своей статье «Преодоление системных угроз национальной безопасности России»: «Говоря о национальной безопасности современной постбеловежской России, следует уточнить о какой из двух существующих ныне «Россий» идёт речь. Ведь либеральная свистопляска 1990-х годов помала страну через колено на две неравные противоборствующие «России»: олигархически-мафиозную и подзаборно-нищенствующую. Отечество, духовно оккупированное и разграбленное несправедливой приватизацией, фактически расколото на

вотчину сверхбогатеев и жалкое бытийство обездоленного большинства. Разорван социум на два антагонистических лагеря. Соответственно, у каждого из этих образований - свои мировоззренческие и мирозерцательные критерии истины, разные потребности, несравнимые вызовы и угрозы, виды на будущее и сценарии стратегического развития страны».

- 29) И вот недавно В.Путин предложил свой проект новой государственной идеологии – «здоровый консерватизм». Социолог Карл Маннгейм считает, что понадобившаяся особая идеология может служить защите определённого политического или социального порядка от угрожающих ему внешних и внутренних вызовов. Вот этапы сотворения её.

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- 30) Беловежским заговором был ликвидирован Советский Союз. Началась новейшая история России – сперва в общности СНГ, а затем в облике обкромсанной, десуверенной, коматозной РФ, воссиявшей щедринским восторгом глуповцев, освободившихся от себя самих (12 июня 1994 – день официального празднования «независимости России». От чего: разве она была колонией СССР?! Отечество, раздербаненное в «лихие 90-е» «криминал-революционерами»

(«Великая криминальная революция» - термин кинорежиссёра С.С.Говорухина), лишили идеологии «совка» (Красной империи), запретив 13-й статьёй Конституции РФ установление взамен её какой-либо иной «в качестве государственной или обязательной». Рулящий РФ компрадор-олигархат вполне устраивал установившийся коллаборативно-корпоративный строй «экономики трубы», с политикой договорняка «газ со скидкой».

- 31) Но Божьим промыслом и путинскими усилиями госпереворот оказался недоворотом (моя формулировка). Россия возрождается из пепла и руин. В ситуации эскалации угроз и вызовов РФ актуализировался вопрос о создании общенациональной идеологии – гармонизаторе социума, оптимизаторе духа народа и «тротиле» информационно-организационного оружия в геополитическом противоборстве глобальных национальных интересов.

- 32) Правда, у класса начальников наверняка есть нечто по устранению угрозы «Берёзовый революции» в РФ. Это, по характеристике философом Ольги Малиновой, есть набор «сравнительно устойчивых и узнаваемых систем смыслов». Но сия методология скомпрометирована: «возникла коллизия бесправия одних при диктате других

членов общества», и стал очевиден потенциал 'злоупотребления властью' для ослабления конкурентных шансов оппонентов, вплоть до ограничения идеологического плюрализма путём запрета на высказывание тех или иных идей в публичных средах. ... Властвующая элита не вправе использовать государственные инструменты принуждения, чтобы навязывать собственные представления как обязательные или исключать право на высказывание иных точек зрения».

33) Верно, Госдума нередко принимает законы, с позиции непримиримой оппозиции, - сравнимые с «оккупационными». Многие формы общественного протеста объявлены незаконными. Взять, к примеру, штрафы или принудительные работы за «Оскорбление представителя власти» (УК РФ, Статья 319). Страшно далеки такие «законники» от народа. Россия, выбитая беловежским путчем из своей привычной жизни и даже цивилизационной колеи, всё никак не может полноценно самоидентифицироваться и упорядочиться в Законе. Творимый прожект капитализма с человеческим лицом не получается в смысле гармонии масс: слишком жаждён до сверхприбылей олигархат, да при скупости властей на достойное исполнение «социальных гарантий». А проект СССР-2 – пока кошмарит воображение ГУЛАГом.

34) Относительно вопроса о взаимосвязанности плюрализма, государственной идеологии и личностной свободы... Либеральный консерватор правовед Борис Чичерин (право участвовать в государственной власти) рассматривал как высшее развитие личной свободы и её единственную гарантию: «Пока власть независима от граждан, права их не обеспечены от её произвола: в отношении к ней лицо является бесправным». Консервативно-либеральная концепция более органична для учёта всей полифонии спектра разных взглядов в социуме. Для гармонизации социума явно недостаточно рецептуры мультяшно-ельцинской демагогии кота Леопольда: «Ребята, давайте жить дружно!». Нет объявленного «консенсуса» обворованных и воров – бенефициарами приХватизации. Вопиющее социальное неравенство между «нищелюдами» и «златояхтовиками» - никак не согласуется с тезисом жить в добром согласии «по справедливости и по закону».

35) Постсоветская идеосфера три десятилетия вырабатывала крайний антиэтатизм - минимизацию роли государства и пропагандировала вместо совести промативку безбожного обогащения. Такой чудовищный крен парадигмы России был закреплён суперпрезидентской Конституцией. Потому подорванные силы минимизированного и ослаблен-

ного государства спровоцировали серию терактов с 1991 (Чечня и Дагестан) по 2004 (Беслан). Но Владимиру Путину удалось переломить тогда «пагубный мегатренд» (регресс, дерегуляцию) укреплением «вертикали власти» и ускорением национальной самоидентификации.

36) В октябре 1994 С.Шахрай и В.Никонов обнародовали «Консервативный манифест» — «консерватизма с российским лицом». В нем содержались основные постулаты классического консерватизма, подкреплённые цитатами от У.Черчилля до К.Леонтьева. В то же время предпринимается попытка создания идеологической доктрины «демократического патриотизма» (В.Шумейко, В.Костиков). Составными элементами «новой идеологии» стала концепция формирования политической нации «россиян»: общепатриотическая риторика, включавшая в себя идею России как великого государства, заявления о необходимости реинтеграции постсоветского пространства, с ведущей ролью России как «первой среди равных», воскрешение формулы «единая и неделимая Россия». Однако теория «новой российской нации» не прижилась. Применение же формулы «единая и неделимая Россия» в «наведении конституционного порядка в Чеченской республике» положительно сработала. Российская государ-

ственность устояла перед сепаратистским вызовом «Ичкерии».

37) С 1996 по август 1998, по оценке историком Сергеем Пантелеевым, - активное время поиска «национальной идеи», призванной консолидировать общество. После непростой победы на президентских выборах («голосуй – или проиграешь!»), ещё более обостривших идейную поляризацию российского общества, Б.Ельцин 12 июля 1996 инициировал процесс разработки единой национальной доктрины, поручив выяснить «какая национальная идея, национальная идеология – самая главная для России» («Независимая газета». 1996, 13 июля, с.1). Однако кризис 17 августа 1998 (впервые в мировой истории государство объявило дефолт по внутреннему долгу) подвёл черту под проводившемся с 1992-го социально-экономическим, политическим и идеологическим курсом.

38) Этап с сентября 1998 по конец 1999 - возгонка «консервативной волны», на гребне которой осуществлялась операция «пре-емник» - транзит власти без потрясения/революции. Консервативная доктрина Е.Примакова-стратегия укрепления страны с построением «социально ориентированного рынка с государственным участием» - отвечала ожиданиям власти и общества. Идеологическая ниша «просве-

* * *

щённого» консерватизма (за-
вуалированная триада графа
С.С.Уварова) закрепились про-
граммным положением о необхо-
димости «национальной идеи»,
понимаемой как «патриотизм,
державность, государственниче-
ство и социальная солидарность»
 («Независимая газета», 1999, 30
дек., с. 4). Но одно дело провоз-
гласить консервативно-держав-
ный курс, а другое – реализовать.
Как заявил тогдашний серый
кардинал Кремля Владислав
Сурков, «мы, конечно, безуслов-
ные консерваторы, хотя пока и не
знаем, что это такое». Консерва-
тизм как модный бренд. Д.Трамп
побеждает Х.Клинтон (США), Н.
Фарадж – Д.Кэмерона (Англия),
движение «Пять звёзд» - брюс-
сельскую бюрократию (Италия),
В.Орбан - силы, олицетворяемые
Д. Соросом (Венгрия). Один из
номеров влиятельного журна-
ла «Foreign Affairs» констатиру-
ет факт: «В наши дни никому в
Америке, кажется, не хочется
быть либералом - или хотя бы
слыть им». А консервативное из-
дание «National Review» печатает
выдержку из книги философа
Й.Хазони под заголовком «Либе-
рализм как империализм». Уже в
2018-м другую книгу этого авто-
ра на ту же тему - «Достоинство
Национализма» («The Virtue of
Nationalism») многие объявили
самой важной публикацией кон-
сервативной мысли со времён
знаменитой книги Хантингтона
«Столкновение цивилизаций».

39) Такова тенденция времени. И
Россия – не исключение: идёт от
западничества – к патриотизму,
от радикализма – к консерватиз-
му, от «свободного рынка» – к
государственничеству, от идео-
логического нигилизма – к еди-
ной национальной идее. В.Пу-
тин называет свою идеологию то
«здоровым», то «разумным», то
«умеренным» консерватизмом.
Известный российский идео-
лог и евразиец Александр Дугин
в серии очерков «Либерализм
- угроза человечеству» писал:
«Интуитивно стремясь сохра-
нить и восстановить суверенитет
России, Путин вошёл в конфликт
с либеральным Западом и его
глобализационными планами, но
и в альтернативную идеологию
это не оформил». А разве он со-
бирался «оформлять» какую-то
развёрнутую антизападную иде-
ологию? Вряд ли. Ибо его кон-
фликт с либеральным Западом
не имеет антагонистического
характера. «В отличие от Бориса
Ельцина В.Путин не радикал. В
отличие от советских лидеров он
не догматик».

40) Путинский консерватизм есть
идеология сохранения общества
таким как есть на данный момент
(конечно же, с перспективой им-
манентного развития). Понятно:
эволюционные перемены, «без
потрясений». Но поскольку об-
щество поляризовано – то обоим
противопоставляемым нельзя

угодить. А вот выбор президента кому угодить – за ним. Его валдайская речь об идеологии базируется на «философии неравенства» философа Н.Бердяева. В ней не сказано о намерении организовать общественную жизнь по справедливости для всех и каждого члена общества. А значит «консервируется» какое есть: заведомо несправедливое устройство социума. И от народа трудно ожидать любви к такой власти.

41) А ведь учитывать бы надо и рефлекторную реакцию народа: нутряной консерватизм русского сознания. Это феномен притяжения к традиции, как этногравитационная константа (мой термин). Например, у Достоевского персонаж Фалалей – видит постоянно сон про белого бычка. Ещё пример – от политика В.С. Черномырдина: «Какую бы общественную организацию мы ни создавали - получается КПСС». Да и сам русский «консерватизм» разве функционально не таков же? Ведь в политической российской науке он синонимичен понятию «монархия», понимаемой как Самодержавие. Так что «охранительство» подлинных ценностей русской корневой системы априори должно быть проимперским, православно-народным – с приматом справедливости, совести, чести, доблести – Правды превыше всего. Такова потребность органичного суще-

ствования русского народа.

42) Путинская идеологическая заявка не крайностна, а общегуманитарна, без кардинальных новаций: «Консервативный подход - не бездумное охранительство, не боязнь перемен и не игра на удержание, тем более не замыкание в собственной скорлупе. Это прежде всего опора на проверенную временем традицию (да, но на какую именно: имперскую, недавнюю советскую, или воровскую?..-м.р.Е.В.), сохранение и преумножение населения, реализм в оценке себя и других, точное выстраивание системы приоритетов, соотношение необходимого и возможного, расчётливое формулирование цели, принципиальное неприятие экстремизма как способа действий».

43) Путинский идеологический концепт базируется на бердяевской «философии неравенства». Если это намёк на крепёж системы неравенства в российском социуме, то трудно отделаться от мысли о Божье-законном противодействии народа в ответ на такое злоупотребление властью. А бунт в России, по Пушкину, «решительный и беспощадный». Востребованная российским обществом неотложная тотальная справедливость не может дальше игнорироваться популистским режимом, допускающим лишь косметическое прихорашивание

его антинародной неприглядной сущности, а не ожидаемый демонтаж изначально чуждой и гнилой конструкции. Хотя Кремль заверяет, что возврата к 1937-му не будет, телекомментатор Вл.Соловьев то и дело предлагает власти назначить его карающим мечом органов -Глав-СМЕРШевцем. Всё не столь однозначно в этом «королевстве кривых зеркал».

- 44) А к Н.Бердяеву, если и апеллировать, – то с большей осторожностью. Ибо этот философ-экзистенциалист– «великий путаник», и может завести мимо цели. Более подходящим для выработки кремлёвской новой идеологии мне представляется зачинатель русской политологии профессор Московского университета Б.Н.Чичерин (пусть и объявил его Н.А.Бердяев «врагом демократии»). Б.Чичерин отстаивает конституалистский политико-правовой идеал. Руководящей идеей его «Курса государственной науки» было стремление «примирить начала свободы с началами власти и закона». Таков базовый постулат чичеринской программы охранительного либерализма, основной политический лозунг которого – «либеральные меры и сильная власть». К тому же, у него технологически умелее сопряжено «неравенство» со «справедливостью»: «Равенство состояний столь же мало вытекает из требований справед-

ливости, как и равенство телесной силы, ума, красоты». Равенство прав (формальное) нельзя заменить равенством состояний (материальным). В русской политической культуре мало кто обосновывал столь убедительно онтологическую природу неравенства. Разве что ещё философ и дипломат Константин Леонтьев, для консерватизма которого Лев Толстой и Фёдор Достоевский – лишь «розовые христиане», не в должной мере препятствующие тенденции отпадения русского народа от Православия. Глубокая воцерковленность побудила его стать монахом.

- 45) «Президент Путин, - писал я в 2007-м,- наверняка знаком с либерально-консервативной концепцией Бориса Чичерина, сформулировавшего политический принцип, весьма подходящий для нынешней власти в России: *“либеральные меры и сильная власть”*. “Это был, - характеризует Чичерина Бердяев, - редкий в России государственный, очень отличный в этом и от славянофилов, и от левых западников... Он принимает империю, но хочет, чтобы она была культурной и впитала в себя либеральные правовые элементы». Пункты, созвучные с путинскими.

- 46) И ещё штрих в пользу чичеринского лекала для кройки идеологии. Пупутал-таки Бердяев.

«Консерватизм, - пишет философ, - это не то, что мешает идти вверх и вперёд, а то, что мешает идти назад и вниз, к хаосу». По контексту, хаос присущ состоянию до консерватизма. У Путина же «хаос» - гипербола, употребление в переносном смысле, уподобление подрывной (террористической) хаотизации масс. Бердяевский импульс другого замеса: да, «напор хаотической тьмы снизу» (это верно), но не анархо-протестантов, а «первородно-греховной зверино-хаотической стихии в человеческих обществах». Некие досоциуинные фантомы. А главное у Бердяева вот что: «хаотическая бесформенная тьма сама по себе не есть ещё зло, а лишь бездонный источник жизни». Путинская же мысль о бытовом «экстремизме» не вытекает из бердяевского онтологического «зла». Вообще с высшим советничеством по «злу» плохо обстоит дело в РФ, хотя Институт философии РАН потратил 742 тысячи рублей на исследование об аде и зле.

47) Зло не изначально, а постфактумно. Конфуций тому свидетельствует: «Зло не имеет самостоятельной причины в мироздании». Зло не могло быть создано добрым Небом в качестве самостоятельного элемента мира. Оно проистекает от нарушения порядка (не имеется в виду «общественный порядок»!-м.р.Е.В.), то есть от на-

рушения добра непониманием небесного порядка. Мы вносим в мир беспорядочность, разрушая изначальную гармонию, мы создаём в нем хаос, тем самым нарушая и уничтожая первоначальный порядок. Так появляются несчастья и беды, так появляется зло. Таким образом, оно есть результат нарушения мирового баланса или упорядоченности. Зло – это разбалансированность мироздания. По Бердяеву, хаос органично коррелирует с порядком. Он позитивная первокаатегория мироздания (как в китайской «космогонии»), а не из разряда «массовых беспорядков» (дисгармония, бунтарство).

48) Так что самый раз индоктринировать в новую идеологию элементы либертарианского консерватизма: правое политическое течение, которое стремится объединить либертарианские и консервативные идеи, то есть, пытается развить идею сохранения традиций и сохранения консервативного курса развития, при этом сохраняя индивидуальную свободу отдельного человека. Соборность позволяла человеку видеть в себе личность или, говоря словами А. И. Клибанова, христианство воспитывало внутренний суверенитет личности. По абрису и сущности путинская идеологема – «либертарианский консерватизм», а потребность же России, как осаждённой крепости – иная: «стратегический кон-

серватизм Победы».

49) Консерватизм может быть компонентом в разной мировоззренческой комбинаторике. Так что «идеология порядка и охранительства» подвопросна. Ведь «порядок» в лозунге «анархия - мать порядка» - не легитимен для «охранительства». И то же самое - о власти. А если это «отмытое самовластье»? Консерватизм для России - естественный исторически и ментально выверенный консолидатор народа и предпосылочное условие установления нового баланса общественных интенций — между «иконой» (порядком) и «топором» (бунтом).

50) Не веря в добровольную смену «неизменного» курса страны, последователи народно-монархической стержневой русской ориентации уповают на спасение Отечества «национальной военной диктатурой». О путчевом сценарии смены власти пишут и на Западе: например, в книге Кэтрин Белтон «Люди Путина: как КГБ захватил Россию, а затем взялся за Запад» (Catherine Belton, "Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West"). Ясно одно: без смены парадигмы нынешнего курса РФ - «национализации» самой логики мышления и усиления прорусской доминанты - страна утратит не только суверенитет, но и жизненные ресурсы

для воспроизведения нации. Деграция и депопуляция народонаселения РФ - демографическая катастрофа с геостратегическими последствиями (с численно малым народонаселением в 145 975 300 человек - трудно сохранить Родину от Калининграда до Владивостока).

51) «Главным началом» путеводной идеологии должно стать усвоение аксиомы: Русская идея - имперская по сути - «зиждатель национального самосознания, культуры и религиозного промысла, как предназначение нации». Её категории Духовность, Державность и Соборность триедины - по образцу Святой Троицы и триады Добро, Истина и Красота. И помнить, что и либерал не жупел, и консерватор - не спасение, если не живут Россией. Как Герцен говорил о западниках и славянофилах: *они «смотрели в разные стороны», а «сердце билось одно»*. У таких своих задор молодости мудреет с возрастом, без сшибки друг с другом живут: «Кто в молодости не был либералом - у того нет сердца, кто в зрелости не стал консерватором - у того нет ума».

52) В плане конкретного примирения идеологических лагерей Русского мира вспоминается один биографический факт. В конце 1970-х мы с философом Петром Болдыревым первыми в Зарубежье попытались примирить

между собой «либералов» и «консерваторов». В совместной статье «Солженицын и Янов», появившейся в довлатовском «Новом американце» (“New American”, New York), №59, 24-31 марта 1981, с.36), вместо привычного «либо-либо» мы объединили полюса, заменив эту расточительную бесплодную дизъюнкцию обнадеживающим «и-и». Задались вопросом: а не просматривается ли в исторических концепциях оппонентов, в их интерпретациях русской истории некоего «единства противоположностей» - при всём видимом и неоспоримом дуализме, очевидной несводимости их одна к другой? Оказалось, что и «прогрессисты» (либералы), и «интуитивисты» неизменных ценностей в истории (консерваторы - сторонники «народной субстанции», «общины», «народной души») идеологически «впадали» в русский «либеральный консерватизм» или «охранительный либерализм» Б.Чичерина, которого высоко ценили как либерал П.Струве, так и консерватор И.Ильин. Кредо консервативного (конкретного) либерализма можно выразить примерно так: не «либерализм вообще», а включающий национально-культурные традиции; не провинциальный, ущемлённо-национальный «консерватизм» (охранительство), а покоящийся на общечеловеческих культурных ценностях. Иногда в этих идеологических азимутах

можно запутаться. Например: в Англии либерализму восемь веков, начавшемуся Великой Хартией вольностей - Magna Charta Libertatum. Стало быть, либеральные ценности свободы личности - более традиционные. Значит ли это, что приверженность именно ценностям либерализма оказывается самым махровым консерватизмом?

- 53) За поставленный нами тогда риторический вопрос: не пора ли современной русской оппозиции (с её историографией) обратить более пристальное внимание на этот третий, «средний» путь - дрейф конфронтаторов от противоборства к синтезу - нам досталось по полной от тех и других. Здоровый баланс консерватизма и либерализма коррекционно совершенствует обоих эти духовные устремлённости, нейтрализуя их крайние формы самовыражения - впадания консерватизма в «обскурантизм», а либерализма - «экстремальный прогрессивизм». Дефиниция между социальными группами сложнее, чем с аналогами из естествознания. Металлы «тоже» (как и идеологии) подвержены трансмутации и добрососедствуют с себе подобными - металлоидами. Классификация элементарна: неспаренные *d-электроны* дают жизнь *переходным металлам*. А тайны социума - приоткрываются дьявольскими отмычками: научили нейросеть

определять политические взгляды человека. Искусственный интеллект может по фотографии выявить сторонников либерализма и приверженцев консервативных взглядов. Оказывается: либералы чаще смотрят прямо в объектив фотокамеры, выражая удивление. У приверженцев же консервативных взглядов на лице просматривается отвращение. Либералы не переносят даже запаха консерваторов. Экспериментально вывели, что консерваторы брезгливее либералов. Вывод далеко идущий: возможно, то, что либералы практически не испытывают отвращения ни к чему, и толкает их на перемены. На протесты. Или даже на революционные преобразования. Зато консерваторы оказываются счастливее либералов: чем более либерален человек, тем он несчастнее. И наоборот. Объясняют феномен разным пониманием справедливости. Радоваться либералам мешает ощущение того, что разница между бедными и богатыми слишком велика, что общественные блага распределены как-то неправильно. От этого они, как правило, несчастливы даже в личной жизни.

* * *

54) Новый идеологический конгломерат консервативно-либерального наследия всего лучшего неизбежно аккомодирует в себе базовые ценности «классического» либерализма, такие как: аб-

солютная ценность человеческой личности и естественное («от рождения») равенство всех людей; существование определённых неотчуждаемых прав человека, таких как право на жизнь, личную свободу (в пределах чужой), справедливость; создание государства на основе общего консенсуса с целью сохранить и защитить естественные права человека; верховенство закона как инструмента социального контроля и «свобода в законе» как право и возможность «жить в соответствии с постоянным законом, общим для каждого в этом обществе и не быть зависимым от непостоянной, неопределённой, неизвестной самовластной воли другого человека» (Дж. Локк); способность каждого индивида к духовному прогрессу и моральному совершенствованию. «Участвуя в экономической жизни общества, - завещает Адам Смит из XVIII века, - каждый человек, кроме удовлетворения собственных интересов, поневоле способствует реализации общих интересов, ибо они - не что иное, как "сумма интересов отдельных членов общества"».

55) Основными чертами консерватизма считается: «Сохранение древних моральных традиций человечества; уважение к мудрости предков; неприятие радикальных изменений традиционных ценностей и институтов; убеждённость в том, что общество

нельзя построить в соответствии с умозрительно разработанными схемами; счастье невозможно без гармоничных отношений с обществом» (античные философы и консерватор Э.Берк). В современном консерватизме разные группировки объединены общими концепциями, идеями, идеалами. Хотя консерватизм традиционно отождествляется с защитой общественного статус-кво, характерной чертой современного консервативного ренессанса стал тот факт, что именно неоконсерваторы и «новые правые» выступили инициаторами изменений, направленных на перестройку существующего порядка. Так что не исключено вспенивание смуты как слева, так и справа. Между крайностными общего больше, нежели между центристами.

- 56) Видимо, такая двойственность закономерна. Ведь в либерализме изначально присутствует консервативный элемент. Так у мэтра либерализма Джона Локка, в его теории общественного договора значителна неполная передача народом своих властных полномочий государству: они лишь делегируются для защиты всего общества. Иными словами, создавая государство, люди стремились обеспечить свои гражданские интересы, защитить свою свободу. «Речь, - как пишет исследователь вопроса Н.Андреев, - идёт о свободе совести, мысли, защите своего правового стату-

са, исполнении налоговых обязанностей, санкционированных государством и закреплённых в законодательстве и т.д. В силу изложенного либералы отстаивают необходимость принятия в каждом государстве Конституционного акта, закрепляющего права и свободы личности и гражданина». Славянофилам же, исповедующим внутреннюю правду как первостепенный регулятор общественных отношений, претило регламентированное законничество «договорняка». По их убеждению, Самодержавие и Народ единятся общим исповедуемым Православием. Как писал И.Аксаков: «в том-то вся и сущность союза Царя с народом, что божественная нравственная основа жизни у них едина, единый Бог, единый Судия, един Господень закон, единая правда, единая совесть». В основе деятельности и Земли (народа), и Царя являются Божественная воля и Правда. Следовательно, согласно славянофильской доктрине, ни о каких договорных началах возникновения власти речь идти не может. Монархия – лучшая для России форма правления, обеспечивавшая подлинную свободу.

- 57) Страшно далека от народа правящая номенклатура. Если Россию 1917-го погубили именно крайние «либералы» – почему такие до сих пор во власти?! В ситуации, когда народ и власть сосу-

ществуют как бы в параллельных реальностях, и «слуги народа» прислуживают правящему компрадор-олигархату, нередко принимая явно антинародные законопроекты, - большинство граждан РФ ждёт реальной пронародной политики, реализуемой не важно какой партийной эмблематики, лишь бы «своей в доску» по интересам и неподкупным принципам.

58) Всё что угрожает русской идентичности, не должно санкционироваться властями. Разве что в ограниченном разовом употреблении: как император Павел посоюзничал с еретиками и католиками в противодействии Французской революции. А то с перестройкой фактически ликвидировали принцип соборности, и в качестве главной власти церкви был объявлен не собор, а администрация патриарха и архиереев. Митрополит Иларион после встречи с Папой Франциском сказал: «В православном народе существует очень большое предубеждение против католиков, и мы никоим образом не должны рисковать единством наших церквей и миром в наших церквях, поэтому мы должны во взаимоотношениях с католиками продвигаться с той скоростью, с которой возможно». Случайно ли, когда Россия сосредоточивается, Патриарх Кирилл предостерегает «начальников» от тирании? Или срабатывает ель-

цинская несменяемая система «сдержек и противовесов»? Тоже «традиция». Консерватизм - это верность изначальному Замыслу Божию, то есть православной религии и соответствующая идеология устройства земной государственной жизни. Это «цветущая сложность» цивилизационной специфики.

59) Попытки законсервировать правящий в РФ режим государственным «консерватизмом», «совершенно противоположным русской национальной традиции и осознанию русского народа как соборной личности», чревато потрясениями и деградацией страны. Для имперца монархического склада сознания неприемлем госконсерватизм, охранительный и от чрезмерных претензий Запада, и от собственного народа - узаконенный олигархической «многонациональной» конституцией и умножением карательных «экстремистских» статей в УК. К сожалению, и нынешнее церковное руководство нередко понимает свой консерватизм как жреческое служение любой власти, которой якобы не бывает «не от Бога». Но в нынешних условиях либерально-майданный бунт мог бы привести к власти в России правителей, ещё более враждебных русской традиции. «Идеология Победы как национальный проект» призвана противостоять идеологии «инклюзивный капитализм» нового глобалистского

порядка имени Клауса Шваба. Сам Божий Промысел обязывает Россию сыграть роль того самого Удерживающего, о котором говорил апостол Павел (2 Фес. 2: 7), в этой битве против мирового зла.

60) Сегодня российская власть позиционирует себя как приверженец консервативных ценностей, но действует чаще как прагматик и «дистиллированный либерал». Писатель Александр Проханов на вопрос, что плохого в либерализме, отвечает: «Опыт общения России с либералами кончается для страны совершенно трагично — Россия распадается. Либералы могут быть яркими и прекрасными, но их присутствие во власти приводит к тому, что они разрушают государство, не предлагая никаких других основ. Россия рушится и для её восстановления приходится возвращать имперскую форму правления огромной ценой — ценой потери исторического времени и потерей людей». Левые и правые отечественные консерваторы являются «державниками», для которых сильное государство является одной из ключевых ценностей. Россия в настоящее время все ещё борется с наследием «третьей смуты» 1991. Это – и потерянные территории, и экономические проблемы, и «негласная поддержка Вашингтонского консенсуса».

61) Французская исследовательница современного русского консер-

ватизма Джульетт Фор пишет в своей диссертации о создающейся в идеологии на основе синтеза традиции и модерна, динамическом консерватизме (Juliette Faure.(2019) *L'idée de tradition au cœur de la politique du régime russe contemporain: un «conservatisme dynamique»?*.) Автор цитирует главного идеолога «динамического консерватизма» Виталия Аверьянова, утверждающего, что стоит задача «создать кентавра из православия и инноваций, из высокой духовности и высоких технологий. Этот кентавр будет представлять лицо России XXI века». Видимо, без «кентавра» - устрещающего симбиоза мудрости и смелости в лице древнего славянского божества Китовраса никак. Ибо, если верить Збигневу Бжезинскому, нельзя выиграть в холодной войне не имея альтернативной идеологии: «Чтобы быть военным противником США в мировом масштабе, России придётся выполнить какую-то миссию, осуществлять глобальную стратегию и...обрести идеологическую основу». Хотя Бжезинскому это кажется «маловероятным», Россия пробует разные варианты «спасения себя и мира». Прикидывает грядущий строй - меритократии (власть лучших) под эгидой специально созданного официального Стратегического совета РФ, оснащённого мощным «идеологическим оружием». Что однако не должно мешать, как го-

ворит философ И.Ильин, «душе русского народа всегда искать своих корней в Боге и в его земных явлениях: в правде, праведности и красоте».

62) Понятно, ныне греки, неовизантизм – «это всё наше». Но с позиции временной «обратной перспективы» (термин Д.С.Лихачёва), те «передние веки» для нас – самое важное: там первопричина нынешней «бесцелостности» РФ, как в ментальном, так и территориальном смыслах. Без строгой, ригористичной оценки случившегося с Родиной – от Никонова раскола до расстрела парламента – не выработать национальной идеологии русского народа.

63) С распадом Советского Союза была ликвидирована, как пережиток, и «совковая» идеология. Однако в условиях обострившегося ныне цивилизационного противоборства между историческими антагонистами российскому истеблишменту для консолидации нации потребовалась патриотическая идеология. Так родилась идеология «стратегического консерватизма». Апробирована она «второй зимней войной» - по «денацификации» Украины (термин на манер искоренения нацистской идеологии *Entnazifizierung*). Встаёт

вопрос: если целью этой спецоперации провозглашено уничтожение «нацистского режима» бандеровцев, то для чего Кремль ведёт сепаратные переговоры с «украинами», предварительно не решив сперва своей поставленной задачи?! Путин отступает, наторкнувшись на неожиданное (просчёт разведки) сильное сопротивление противника? Или это тактика победы «иными средствами» (усыпить бдительность противника сменой кнута на пряник)? Ведь изначальная заявка на денацификацию широко контекстна: она подразумевает не только зачистку ЦЕЛИКОМ Украины, НО И ШИРЕ (Польша? Приднестровье? Прибалтика?) Что же заставило Путина пойти на «Хасавюрт2»? Только ли маячащий за проектом сепаратного договора интересы олигарха Абрамовича и иже с ним? Кремлю опасно потерять патриотическую личину в глазах народа, ожидающего «взятия Киева» (чтобы жертвы были не напрасны). Вот и мечется правящая «элитита» между Сциллой и Харибдой — между двумя плохими вариантами исхода операции. Кремль в ситуации *Zugzwang* «принуждение к ходу» — положение в шахматах, в котором любой ход игрока ведёт к ухудшению его позиции.

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